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PREFACE 
 
Land conflicts often have extensive negative effects on economic, 
social, spatial and ecological development. This is especially true in 
developing countries and countries in transition, where land market 
institutions are weak, opportunities for economic gain by illegal action 
are widespread and many poor people lack access to land. Land 
conflicts can have disastrous effects on individuals as well as on groups 
and even entire nations. Many conflicts that are perceived to be clashes 
between different cultures are actually conflicts over land and related 
natural resources.  
In the past, Germany has actively supported international declarations 
and action plans which explicitly demand secured access to land – 
especially for disadvantaged groups – such as the Habitat II Conference 
in Istanbul 1996, World Bank Land Research Conferences from 2001 to 
2007, EU Second Forum on Sustainable Rural Development in Africa 
2007 etc. 
This guide has been written for all those working in the land sector, in 
natural resource management and in urban and rural development. It 
aims to broaden the understanding of the complexity of causes that lead 
to land conflicts in order to provide for better-targeted ways of 
addressing such conflicts. It also provides a number of tools with which 
to analyse land conflicts. Successful analysis of land conflicts is seen as 
a vital step towards their eventual settlement. Finally, this guidebook 
discusses a wide variety of options for settling ongoing land conflicts 
and for preventing new ones.  
In addition, the guide provides useful training material for educators and 
lecturers in courses in land administration and land management. 
 
Eschborn, February 2008 
 
 
 
Albert Engel     Christian Graefen 
Head of Division    Sector Project 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food   Land Management 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
From the ancient Greek myths we know that in the beginning people 
lived happily together in simple harmony. This Golden Age of peaceful 
coexistence did not last, however. With the onset of the current Iron Age 
people divided the land among them and rendered it into private 
property, for which they have continued to fight one another to this day.  
 
Land conflicts are indeed a widespread phenomenon, and can occur at 
any time or place. Both need and greed can equally lead to them, and 
scarcity and increases in land value can make things worse. Land 
conflicts especially occur when there is a chance to obtain land for free 
– no matter if this land is state, common or someone’s private property. 
Inheritance conflicts and disputes between neighbours are most often 
about land (and other immobile property). In post-conflict situations or 
during the early phases of economic transition (e. g. privatisation), when 
regulatory institutions, controls and mechanisms of sanctions are not yet 
in place, people eagerly grab land if their position allows for it – or 
forfeit land if they are in a weak position. In those countries where land 
only now – and slowly – is receiving a material value and increasingly 
becoming private property (such as all over Africa), people also try to 
accumulate as much land as possible. During colonial times, dominant 
European nations tried to occupy all the land outside Europe that 
seemed useful (fertile or rich in minerals). Today, the powerful are 
mostly national elites and international (mining) companies. The 
conflicts though are similar: local people with long-standing de facto 
rights often held for several generations lose their land to the powerful.  
 
This guide addresses the issues related to land conflicts, but will restrict 
itself to disputes within one nation state. International conflicts involve 
different approaches to conflict resolution, and would therefore go be-
yond the scope of this publication and the mandate of most of its users.  
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Photo 1: Land conflicts in the daily press 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The scope of the problem 
 
Land conflicts occur in many forms. There are conflicts between single 
parties (as for instance boundary conflicts between neighbours), inherit-
ance conflicts between siblings and disputes over the use of a given 
piece of land. These conflicts are comparably easy to solve. Those that 
include several parties though - such as group invasions or evictions of 
entire settlements – are more difficult to deal with. In Brazil, in the State 
of Amazonas, it is suspected that fully one third of its land area has been 
illegally appropriated (Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development 
2001). But by far the most complex land conflicts are those that include 
corrupt land administration and state capture.  
Daily Graphic Friday, November 15, 2001
GHANA‘S BIGGEST SELLING NEWSPAPER   
_________________________________________________________________   
60.000 Land Cases
choke our courts and slow development
It is estimated that more than 60.000 land related-litigations are pending before the various courts in Ghana.
Greater Accra Region tops the list with over 20.000 cases.
 
Children claiming their land 
for use as a playground 
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Box 1: Indians battle Brazilians to keep land 
According to official maps, the remote area of Raposa Serra do Sol in the Amazon 
region is an Indian reservation. However, white newcomers to the land are using the 
judicial system to try to evict the Indians who have been living there for generations 
from part of the reservation. Seizing advantage of bureaucratic indifference, these 
people, led by powerful rice growers and ranchers, have persuaded judges to order 
Indians to leave the land. “We were here before the Brazilian state was even formed,” 
protested Secundino Raposa, a 61 year old resident of a Macuxi Indian village called 
Javari.  
Source: The New York Times, 25.10.2004 
 
In many countries, indigenous people have been dispossessed or live at 
risk of being dispossessed due to either failure to recognise their rights 
to land or invalidation of those rights by the state, or through expropri-
ation or privatisation of their lands by the state (UN-HABITAT/ 
OHCHR 2005). In countries where part of the population – often 
indigenous people – have historically been deprived of their land rights, 
more serious conflicts can arise even decades or generations later. 
Guatamala provides such a case. In 1879, communal lands were de facto 
expropriated by a law giving proprietors three months to register land 
titles, after which the land would be declared abandoned. Most of the 
“abandoned” land was then allocated to large coffee growers. Although 
there were attempts at redistribution in the early 1950s, these were 
stopped and reversed following a military coup in 1954. Since then, 
struggle over land has continued, leading to violent conflict time and 
again (Deininger 2003). 
 
In Kenya, the Ndung’u report from 2004 revealed that former Presidents 
Kenyatta and Moi, as well as cabinet ministers, former high ranking 
civil servants and other influential people have been among the major 
beneficiaries of illegal allocations of public land. Land grabbing in 
Kenya is such a common phenomenon that it is even reflected in 
contemporary art. The Kenyan painter Lonaa, who documents the 
everyday street life of the poor, placed a hoarding with the sign “Land 
reserved for grabbers” in the centre of one his recent paintings. 
Corruption – bribery, fraud, nepotism, favouritism and clientelism – in 
land administration and state land management is a widespread problem, 
and leads to a high number of land conflicts all over the world. 
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Box 2: The making of land grabbing millionaires in Kenya 
Ngong Road Forest next to Africa’s largest informal settlement Kibera with an 
estimated population of over 700,000 people provides a source of income for the poor 
from the harvesting of various products including firewood, poles and medical plants. 
The forest’s flora and fauna include over 120 bird species and over 35 mammals. The 
forest serves as well as water catchment as for recreational use and finally provides 
oxygenation for Nairobi’s air pollution threatened inhabitants. In 1932, an area of 
2,926.6 ha had been gazetted as forest reserve. Today, hardly a quarter of it is left. The 
allocations of Ngong Road Forest provide a sad example of how public resources have 
been used to unjustly enrich a few and how state corporations were used to perpetuate 
grand corruption. State corporations did not just lose land entrusted to them but they 
were also pressurized to purchase illegally acquired public land at exorbitant prices. 
Many became captive buyers of land from politically connected allottees. In 2001, for 
example, part of the forest land was illegally excised, subdivided into 32 plots and 
allocated to 13 companies who sold them to Kenya Pipeline Company for Ksh 
262,388,478 (US $ 3.639.471).  
Source: KNCHR/KLA 2006 
 
Traditional chiefs, too, increasingly enter into illicit practises, selling 
land they are supposed to hold in trust to non-group members or to the 
state, causing landlessness among their own people. Many other land 
conflicts result from the multiple sales and double allocation of land, 
either due to legal pluralism or undocumented customary tenure, or due 
to competing state agencies all legitimized to do so. In Nicaragua for 
instance, there are twelve different ways of getting land titles, resulting 
in ownership conflicts between small and big farmers as well as in 
progressing fronteras agricolas, and the conversion of rain forests into 
agricultural land and pastures (Ortega 1996, Landes 2000).  
 
Box 3.: Multiple sales of peri-urban land in Accra, Ghana 
In Accra, many plots are sold by different people to different clients. While one buyer 
starts constructing, another buyer appears or sends land-guards to destroy the already 
built-up structures, sometimes even attacking the caretakers who are supposed to protect 
the property for the other person. Some years ago, the Katamanso chief gave some of his 
land temporarily to the Anwahia chief and his people for farming. He, however, sold 
that land to a real estate agent who recently found out that part of it had also been sold to 
someone else. He went to court. What had happened was that the Anwahia chief had 
died and his son had sold the land again, either not knowing that it had already been 
given away or thinking that it would not be developed by the real estate agent. Both 
father and son sold the same piece of land, which belongs to the neighbouring clan. 
Source: Wehrmann 2002 
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Due to rural-urban migration as well as natural population growth, most 
cities in developing countries cannot formally absorb all their citizens. 
People therefore tend to squat on public land as the chances of being 
evicted there are slightly lower than on private or common land. The 
problem remains, however, for the city as well as for the squatters living 
in uncertainty. 
 
Box 4: Squatter settlements in Turkey and South Africa 
Gecekondu means “put up over night” and refers to the shacks, houses and in present 
days even apartment buildings that have been built “overnight” on public land in the 
peri-urban areas of Turkish cities. They extend all around Istanbul; they stretch over the 
hills around Ankara. They can definitely not be ignored. Although the culture and 
practise of self-accommodation is based on customs from Ottoman times, the massive 
spread of gecekondus only began in the 1960s after industrialisation and urbanisation 
started to accelerate in the 1950s. When, in the 1980s, scattered informal buildings 
turned into major gecekondu districts, the Government began evicting many of them, 
while others were formalised. Even today, evictions occur and often end up in violent 
conflict between the police and the inhabitants.  
This is a typical example of legitimacy versus legality. Throughout history, sovereignty 
over land (freehold) belonged to the Divinity; mortals only used the land temporarily 
and therefore could rely on local approval and local legitimacy without requiring 
adjudication from some form of formal legal status or conditions. In 1926, though, a 
property rights system based on Roman law was introduced, which required a complete 
change of attitude towards the relationship between different people in regard to land. 
For while the Shari’a places emphasis upon local testimony, Roman law relies on 
documented rights.  
In Johannesburg in the late 1990s, many people were provided with land by a “land 
mafia”. Newcomers staying in the backyard dwellings of friends or relatives in town-
ships close to the city were organised by local, informal community leaders. A team of 
land mafioso then identified a group of landless, already organised people and charged 
them R 50 (US$ 10) each to sign up on a list. Once they had brought together about 
2000 signatures (which corresponded to R 100.000/$ 20.000), they would choose a suit-
able site to occupy. This was planned very precisely and often carried out with profes-
sional assistance. They completed deeds searches on the land to determine who owned it 
and used skilled planners to structure a settlement on paper. They avoided occupying 
private land because they knew that the Government would treat them better than private 
owners. Once the squatters were settled, they had to pay a monthly rent of R 50 ($ 10) 
and an additional R 20 ($ 4) protection fee to the land mafia. They also paid another R 
10 ($ 2,50) legal fee every month. The legal fee was paid into a fund so that a legal 
representative could be called in if action were taken against the squatters. The reason 
why the land developers were called land mafia is that they not only charged a 
protection fee but also used their guns in case somebody was unwilling or unable to pay. 
Sources: Balamir 2002; Saturday Star 21.2.1998 
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The most violent conflicts over land are, however, those that involve 
two groups – often two different ethnic groups – fighting over their 
property. 
 
Box 5: Inter-clan clashes leading to massive displacement in Ethiopia 
In June 2006, more than 23,000 people fled their homes in Southern Ethiopia and have 
been displaced following clashes triggered by disputes over land ownership between 
neighbouring ethnic groups in that area. Between 100 and 150 people had been killed in 
these clashes that started when land formerly belonging to Borenas was awarded to 
Guhis by the government.  
Source: Oxfam, June 2006 
 
However, what is often reported as an ethnic conflict is usually a 
conflict over (arable/pasture) land. 
 
Box 6: Conflict in Darfur fuelled by environmental degradation 
According to a recent study by UNEP, the Darfur conflict is another example of a 
conflict rooted in a struggle over land. Climate change, population growth and an 
increase in livestock combined with poor land use practises, overgrazing and 
deforestation has resulted in the degradation of arable and grazing land leading to 
pastoralists – traditionally living in the dryer Northern regions – taking their herds 
farther south while farmers – traditionally occupying the Southern arable lands – are 
moving farther north, occupying grazing land and watering places as well as obstructing 
the herders’ passage.  
Source: D+C 9/2007 
 
The Darfur conflict is a typical example of a land conflict resulting from 
diverse changes and leading to a much bigger conflict or even war. 
Many conflicts are due to change, in fact: Climate change, environmen-
tal degradation, demographic and economic transition often trigger 
disputes over land (see 2.2.4). Scarcity of land due to environmental 
degradation and population growth often leaves hardly any choice to 
people than fighting for land which might not be theirs. This is different 
in times of economic transition such as privatization. Privatization does 
not force people to fight for land, but it offers (illegal) opportunities to 
make an economic profit.  
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Box 7: Land conflicts due to privatisation in Georgia and Mongolia 
In Mongolia, the privatisation of urban land has resulted in quite a number of multiple 
allocations of land due to illegitimated claims and ineffective, inefficient land 
administration agencies whose staff is partly lacking capacity, partly open for 
inappropriate practises. Resolution of these conflicts lacks transparency and generally 
favours the well-off applicants possessing informal connections to respective decision-
makers. Another irregularity is the allocation of land located in the river bank as well as 
nearby protected areas of Ulaanbaatar to the rich by corrupted high ranking public 
officials.  
 
In Georgia, during the second round of privatisation of agricultural land people 
experienced different illicit practises in regard to auctions such as the manipulation of 
the system resulting in the exclusion of some groups/individuals and preference of other 
groups/individuals. This lobbyism, clientelism and corruption during the privatisation 
process contributed negatively to the already low faith of Georgian citizen in their 
government.  
Sources: Baatar 2007, Bokeria 2006 
 
Box 8: Black land market in China  
China is confronted with the contradiction of securing fertile agricultural land and 
providing construction land for the ever increasing cities. State ownership of urban land 
and collectively owned agricultural land is seen as a means to control the use of land. 
However, due to this dual urban land market and the quite complicated procedures 
required to formally convert collectively owned agricultural land first into urban state 
land and then into either allocated land use rights or granted land use rights for private 
use, there are quite a number of options for illicit practises which circumvent state 
policy. As a shortcut, collectively owned land is often sold by the village leader who, 
while supposed to act on behalf of the entire village community, is acting on his own. 
This results in a decrease of agricultural land for the village community, illegal 
conversion of agricultural land into construction land and the enrichment of the village 
leader. In the cities, public officials are also tempted by profit to illegally lease and sell 
land use rights on state land.  
Sources: Gar-on Yeh 2005, Ma 2007 
 
The actual number of land related conflicts in any country is barely 
known, but estimates of these are high. Those which have been dealt 
with by the courts give an idea of the scope of the problem. In 2001, the 
Ghanaian courts had to deal with 60,000 land related cases (Daily 
Graphic, 15.11.2001). For Cambodia, Cooper (2005) estimates that in 
2005 about 850,000 people had been affected by land conflicts. This 
corresponds to 6.5% of the entire population of the country.  
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All land conflicts, no matter how peaceful or violent they are, produce 
negative consequences for individual people as well as for the entire 
society. Many families across the world have seen their shelters – their 
homes – being bulldozed out of existence. And in Africa, many daily 
experience the selling of their property by someone else who also claims 
to be the owner. In post-war Cambodia, an unknown number of families 
were happy if they only lost their houses to the military but managed to 
save their lives. In many parts of Latin America, small farmers fear to 
lose their farms to big farmers. Whenever there is a land conflict, 
someone suffers economic consequences. In extreme – but not rare – 
situations, people find themselves landless and/or without shelter. In the 
case of a farmer, this often includes the loss of his/her production base. 
But that’s not all. Where there are many land conflicts, social stability 
within society is affected, as land conflicts undermine trust and increase 
fear and suspicion – often between formerly close people such as 
neighbours and family members. Violent land conflicts – or simply the 
fear of becoming a victim of them – can also have a traumatising effect 
on those who are or feel at risk. In addition, whenever state land is 
allocated illegally it generally affects the nation’s budget negatively and 
often results in ecological destruction or social exclusion. Still other 
consequences of land conflicts are unorganised, unstructured land 
development and the subsequent additional costs for infrastructure 
provision. The costs of these have to be borne by the entire society.  
 
So, all over the world, people struggle for land. Many of them struggle 
with land conflicts and some of them struggle to solve them peacefully. 
This manual aims to facilitate the understanding of people’s positions, 
attitudes and behaviours as well as their underlying interests and 
motivation. Understanding these things should enable the reader to 
adequately deal with the many different kinds of land conflicts.  
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1.2 Defining land conflicts 
 
A conflict, as defined by sociologists, is a social fact in which at least 
two parties are involved and whose origins are differences either in 
interests or in the social position of the parties (Imbusch 1999). 
Consequently, a land conflict can be defined as a social fact in which at 
least two parties are involved, the roots of which are different interests 
over the property rights to land: the right to use the land, to manage the 
land, to generate an income from the land, to exclude others from the 
land, to transfer it and the right to compensation for it. A land conflict, 
therefore, can be understood as a misuse, restriction or dispute over 
property rights to land (Wehrmann 2005). Land conflicts defined as 
such can be aggravated if the social positions of the parties involved 
differ greatly (see 1.3).  
 
Although we generally experience conflict as something destructive, 
they nevertheless perform positive functions. Sociological conflict 
theories underline the importance of social conflict for social change 
(Bonacker 1996). Land conflicts, too, can become engines of change if 
they lead to massive protest and consequent changes in policies and 
their implementation. It is therefore important to deal with land conflicts 
in a constructive manner, instead of ignoring them or simply trying to 
stop them. In any event, conflict theorists agree that conflict is 
unavoidable for any society: 
“Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an 
unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions. […] 
Conflict can be prevented on some occasions and managed 
on others, but resolved only if the term is taken to mean the 
satisfaction of apparent demands rather than the total 
eradication of underlying sentiments, memories, and 
interests. Only time really resolves conflicts, and even the 
wounds it heals leave their scars for future reference. But 
short of such ultimate healing, much can be done to reduce 
conflict and thereby release needed energies for more 
productive tasks” (ZARTMAN 1991: 299). 
 
Land Conflicts                                                                                          1 
 10 
A crucial step towards the reduction of conflicts is to better understand 
the apparent demands and interests and – although they cannot neces-
sarily be healed if previously injured– the underlying feelings and 
emotions, too. Important information to find an adequate solution for 
each (land) conflict is gained by increasing this understanding of the 
positions and attitudes of the conflicting parties.  
 
Drawing from the field of conflict management and using the various 
tools with which to analyse conflicts, it becomes obvious that at the root 
of conflicts there are psychological fears and desires (e.g. fear for 
existence, fear of insecurity, desire to be recognised, cared for and 
loved) resulting in material and emotional needs (need for shelter, need 
for a production base, longing for self esteem, or seeking power and 
wealth). These needs shape people’s interests, which then result in their 
attitudes and positions and finally define their behaviour (see figure 1). 
Applied to land conflicts the issue becomes quite complex. Here, there 
are different factors which influence people’s fears and desires to be 
identified, as well as institutional aspects that affect the situation (see 
2.2). 
 
Fig. 1: The roots of conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wehrmann 2005 
(Land) Conflict 
Behaviour
Attitude/Position
Interests
Material Needs Emotional Needs
Psychological 
Fears and Desires
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1.3 The problem of asymmetry in land conflicts –  
the powerful vs. the poor 
 
The most difficult type of land conflict to resolve involves a powerful 
person against one or more poor people. “Powerful” is shorthand for a 
group of categories of people that include high-ranking politicians, civil 
servants, the military, the police, companies and other rich and 
influential groups or individuals. In many countries or situations, the 
poor hesitate and often do not dare to resist the powerful, not least in 
court. If they do, or if the powerful sue them instead, the chances are 
very low that the poor will win the case. This is particularly obvious 
when examining the outcomes of court cases. Resolution in these cases 
tends to favour the powerful. Frequently, cases that involve a powerful 
actor but which have been brought to court by a poor one are not dealt 
with at all. In many cases bribery plays a major role. In other cases, the 
richer party simply can afford the better lawyer.  
 
“Whatever the 1989 Cambodian land law says, the ill-
educated poor are usually defeated by the well-connected 
rich in any legal battle” (The Economist, 10.3.2007). 
 
 
Box 9: Exclusiveness of the Phnom Penh housing market 
Since people began to return to Phnom Penh in 1979, several thousand of them have 
been evicted. Given that after the fall of the Khmer Rouge everyone simply occupied 
whichever house they liked, nobody actually can be considered to be a rightful owner. 
However, status and position – defined by one’s relation to the military and the 
government – decided access to housing. People without connections – very often 
female-headed households which had lost their male family head under the Khmer 
Rouge – were either not at all allowed entering the city or have been chased out of the 
houses they occupied. Having no other alternative at hand, they settled wherever 
possible on public land, over lakes or on rooftops. Since then many of them have been 
targets for eviction. Only in 2003 did the Prime Minister finally agree to provide secure 
tenure and support the upgrading of 100 urban poor communities each year. Evictions 
did not totally stop at that point but have decreased tremendously – without a doubt as a 
result of work by NGOs and the international community, maybe one of the positive 
effects of globalisation. What nobody looked at, however, is the story of Heng Mom* 
and her family – and many others. Since 1979 they have had to move to four different 
places – one smaller than the other: for economic reasons. During the same time Vong 
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Samreth* and his family moved from one property to the other – each one bigger than 
the one before: profiting from the market, favoured by the father’s position. Without a 
father, Keov Phan* and his brother and mother had a much more difficult starting 
position than the other two families in 1979 and never could catch up with Vong 
Samreth’s family. His father died under Pol Pot. His mother almost starved. As she was 
so weak, they returned late to the capital, only to find their grandmother’s house already 
taken. Chased away from the house they then occupied by the military who gave it to 
someone working for the government, they finally found a tiny little place which is now 
worth much less than their former property or the one from which they have been kicked 
out. In Phnom Penh, housing and thereby people’s livelihood in general starts with the 
right connections to the government and is then favoured by the market. Without 
connections the market will do the rest to finalize people’s misery.  
(*All names have been changed to protect people’s identity) 
Source: Wehrmann 2006 
 
Box 10: Peasants vs. latifundista in Venezuela 
In August 2002, in a small town in northern Venezuela, a man wearing a ski mask drove 
up to Pedro Doria, a respected surgeon and leader of the local land committee, called his 
name and, as Doria turned, shot him five times. The committee Doria led was in the 
process of claiming title to idle lands south of Lake Maracaibo which, according to 
government records, belonged to the state and could thus be legally transferred to the 
fifty peasant families that had applied for ownership. However, a local latifundista also 
claimed title to the property and on several occasions had refused to let Doria and 
government representatives inspect it. It is common knowledge in the region that this 
landowner is a close friend of former Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez… Doria 
was not the first peasant leader to be targeted by professional killers or paramilitaries.  
Source: Wilpert 2003 
 
Asymmetry is not exclusively a question of one party being immensely 
richer or more powerful or having much better connections than the 
other party. In many (family) situations it happens that the stronger 
party is only relatively powerful. Examples are grieving widows being 
disinherited by surviving in-laws or HIV/AIDS orphans who have lost 
their land to their guardians. This type of thing has certainly been 
evident in the slums of Nairobi. There, quite a number of orphaned 
children turned to a relative after their parents died, only to find the 
relative apparently more interested in their property than in taking care 
of them (Human Rights Watch 2001). 
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2. UNDERSTANDING LAND CONFLICTS 
 
 
 
 
In order to successfully resolve land conflicts, it is important to be 
aware of the many different types of land conflicts that exist. One 
difference is found in the identity of the actors involved, some of them 
being legitimated to act in the way they do, others not. Other differences 
are found in aspects of the land itself, whether the conflicts occur on 
state, private or commonly owned land. Still other differences result 
from the complexity of causes of the conflict, as well as how these 
influence and intensify one another. Finally, the dimension of a land 
conflict varies significantly which makes a major difference for its 
resolution. Understanding the specific nature of the land conflict under 
consideration is a vital step in its eventual resolution.  
 
Fig. 2: Conflicting rights to land within a National Park (by Jan Birck) 
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2.1 Types of land conflicts 
 
Disputes over land fall into four general categories. Within these 
categories, conflicts may be separated into 35 different types and over 
50 sub-types. This system of classification builds upon the kind of land 
involved (state, private or common property), the specific object of the 
conflict as well as the legitimacy of actions and the level of violence 
used by the parties. 
 
A) Conflicts occurring on all types of property 
  
1. Boundary conflicts  
2. Inheritance conflicts 
3. Ownership conflicts due to legal pluralism 
4. Ownership conflicts due to lack of land registration  
5. Ownership conflicts between state and private/common/collective owners 
6. Multiple sales/allocations of land 
7. Limited access to land due to discrimination by law, custom or practise  
8. Peaceful, informal land acquisitions without evictions 
9. Violent land acquisitions, incl. clashes and wars over land 
10. Evictions by land owners 
11. Illegal evictions by state officials acting without mandate  
12. Market evictions and distortion of local land market/values 
13. Disputes over the payment for using/buying land 
14. Disputes over the value of land 
15. Conflicts between human/cultural and natural use (flora and fauna) 
16. Destruction of property  
 
B) Special conflicts over private property 
 
17. Expropriation by the state without compensation 
18. Sales of someone else’s private property 
19. Leasing/renting of someone else’s private property  
20. Illegitimate expropriations by banks 
21. Conflicts due to land/agrarian reforms 
22. Conflicting claims in post-conflict situations 
23. Illegal/improper uses of private land 
24. Intra-family conflicts, especially in case of polygamy  
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C) Special conflicts over common and collective property 
 
25. Competing uses/rights on common and collective land 
26. Illegal/improper uses of common property 
27. Unauthorised sales of common or collectively owned property 
28. Disputes over the distribution of revenue from customary land 
 
D) Special conflicts over state property 
 
29. Illegal/improper uses of state land 
30. Competing uses/rights on state property 
31. Land grabbing by high-ranking public officials 
32. Illegal sales of state land 
33. Illegal leases of state land (including concession land, forests, mines) 
34. Disputes over revenues from state land generated through lease, sale or 
transformation of its use 
35. Improper land privatisation (e.g. unfair land distribution or titling) 
 
 
Tab. 1: Types and sub-types of land conflicts 
 
Land conflicts on all types of property 
 
Boundary conflicts  
 
• Between individuals (over private land) 
• Between clans (over common property) due to oral tradition 
and physically unfixed boundaries 
• Between administrative units (villages, communes, 
municipalities, districts) 
• Between private individuals and the state (over private or 
state land) 
Ownership conflicts 
linked to inheritance 
• Inheritance conflicts within a family 
• Inheritance conflicts within a clan 
Ownership conflicts 
due to legal pluralism 
• Overlapping/contradictory rights due to legal pluralism 
(customary/indigenous rights vs. statutory law) 
Ownership conflicts 
due to lack of land 
registration 
• Several people claim the same property because a) no land 
registration exists, b) it is in bad conditions or c) it has been 
destroyed 
• Distribution of intermediate tenure instruments which 
cannot be registered 
• Due to unequal knowledge and financial means only the 
well-off register land – even that of others 
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Types Sub-types 
Ownership conflicts 
between state and 
private, common or 
collective owners 
• Unclear and non-transparent demarcation of state land by 
armchair decision resulting in unintended expropriation of 
individuals and groups 
• Special Chinese case of conflicts due to illegitimated 
conversion of collectively owned agrarian land into state 
land for construction 
Multiple 
sales/allocations of 
land 
 
• Multiple sale of privately owned land by private individuals 
• Multiple sale of common property 
• Allocation of same land parcels by the land registration 
office due to technical shortcomings or corruption 
(acceptance of faked titles) 
• Overlapping/contradictory rights due to double allocation of 
land titles by different institutions all legitimised to do so 
• Multiple sale of state land by public officials 
Limited access to 
land due to 
discrimination by 
law, custom or 
practice  
• Women often only get access to land through a male relative 
making them vulnerable in case of divorce or widowhood 
• Ethnic minorities are often discriminated against by law or 
practise 
• Orphans are often de facto excluded from inheriting their 
parents’ property 
Peaceful, informal 
land acquisitions 
without evictions 
• Illegal occupation of state, private or common land (squatter 
settlements, gecekondus etc.) 
• Extensions of property on neighbouring private, public or 
common land (see above)  
• Market-driven displacements within which speculators or 
developers pay less than the real market value due to 
information asymmetry 
Violent land 
acquisitions 
 
• Violent attacks on property owners, including chasing them 
from their property by criminals - often (former) military, 
para-military, military police, guerrillas etc. 
• Illegal occupation of common or collective land by an 
individual or company for private use (often with support of 
corrupt public officials) 
Evictions by land 
owners 
 
• Evictions of semi-legal settlers (those who violate building 
regulations) from state, private or common property 
• Evictions of illegal settlers (those who have no legal rights 
to the property) from state, private or common property 
• Unjustified termination of tenancy/lease contract by 
property owner 
Illegal evictions • Illegal evictions by state officials acting without mandate on 
their own behalf 
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Types Sub-types 
Market evictions and 
distortion of local 
land market/values 
• Poor people not being able to afford to stay on their property 
due to increases in its value and correspondingly in tax or 
rent due to upgrading, formalisation, legalisation or also due 
to foreign investment, including investment funds 
Disputes over the 
payment for using or 
buying land 
 
• Refusing to pay the state for lease of state land 
• Refusing to pay rent for renting private property 
• Disagreement between landlord and tenant over the amount 
of crops to be paid in case of sharecropping 
• Refusing to pay (full amount) in case of land purchase, 
including cheating (e.g. writing invalid checks)  
Disputes over the 
value of land 
• Between citizen and the state in case of compensation or tax 
• Between private persons (e.g. to define indemnity for sibling 
in case of inheritance) 
Conflicts between 
human/cultural and 
natural use 
• Misuse and overuse of agricultural land 
• Salination of irrigated land 
• Contamination of land 
• Unsustainable land uses such as conversion of forests into 
construction land or settlements at risk prone locations 
• Conflicts between natural protection and farming or mining 
• Conflicts between wildlife and peasants 
Destruction of 
property  
 
• Violent attacks on land (e.g. destruction of farmland) 
• Destruction of buildings owned by the owner of the property 
• Destruction of buildings illegally put on a property 
• See above: evictions 
Land conflicts on private property 
 
Expropriations by the 
state without 
compensation 
• Expropriation of landowners without (adequate) 
compensation to use the land for public purposes 
• Expropriation of owners from private or common land 
without (adequate) compensation to allocate the land to 
private companies – and new informal occupations by the 
original (customary) owners to receive the land back  
• Displacement of land owners without giving them adequate 
land and/or sufficient rights to it 
Sales of somebody 
else’s private 
property 
• Private person selling the property of another person 
Leasing/renting of 
somebody else’s 
private property 
• Private person leasing or renting the property of another 
person 
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Types Sub-types 
Illegitimated 
expropriations by 
banks 
• Banks systematically accumulating land in a poor but well 
located neighbourhood by pushing the poor to take a credit 
with excessive interest rates which they are unable to afford 
Conflicts due to land 
reforms 
• Big farmers refusing to give up land 
• Expropriated farmers asking for compensation or the return 
of the land or illegally taking it back 
• Peasants receiving insecure rights only such as provisional 
titles 
• Unfairness in the selection of beneficiaries of land reforms 
Conflicting claims in 
post-conflict 
situations 
• Claims by returning refugees and internally displaced 
people against other people occupying their land without 
authorisation 
• Claims by owners that returning refugees and internally 
displaced people are occupying their land without 
authorisation 
• Claims by refugees that internally displaced people are 
occupying their land without authorisation 
• Conflicts due to the fact that the former lands of refugees 
have been allocated by the (former) government to other 
people during their absence 
Illegal/improper uses 
of private land 
 
• Use of other people’s property (e.g. as a parking lot, 
playground, waste dump, pasture, or for agriculture etc.) 
• Private owner ignoring land use regulations on his property 
(e.g. commercial use of land zoned for residential purposes 
only) 
• Illegal subdivisions of parcels 
• Exceeding the maximum height permitted by building 
regulations 
• Leaving land vacant for speculative purposes (only a 
conflict if forbidden by law) 
• Trespassing on other people’s property 
• Refusal to honour an existing right of way 
Intra-family conflicts  • Disfavoured wife and children not receiving access to fertile 
land 
Land conflicts on common and collectively owned property 
 
Competing uses of 
and rights to common 
or collective property 
• Conflicting interests in common property by farmers and 
pastoralists, or between different users of a forest such as 
small-scale farmers doing rotational agriculture, coffee 
producers, collectors of firewood and others 
• Unequal distribution of common or collective land  
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Types Sub-types 
Illegal/improper uses 
of common property 
• Parcellation and allocation of common land to be used as 
construction land (e.g. ejidos in Mexico) 
Unauthorized sales or 
leases of common or 
collectively owned 
property 
• Unauthorised sale of customary land by chief 
• Unauthorised sale of collectively owned land by head of 
village  
• Illegal sale or lease by leaseholder of collective land  
Disputes over the 
distribution of 
revenue from 
customary land 
• Special case of Ghana where the state administration of 
stool land collects the revenues from customary land 
Land conflicts on state property 
 
Illegal/improper uses 
of state land 
 
• Illegal private use of state land  
• Illegal subleasing of state land 
• Illegal public use of state land (e.g. of open space as dump) 
Competing uses and 
rights on state 
property 
• Unclear responsibility over state land, different state 
authorities claiming ownership 
• Conflicting interests over state land by farmers or 
pastoralists and leaseholders of (forest, agricultural etc.) 
concessions 
• Land allocation in protected areas 
Land grabbing • Registration of state land in their own names (or in those of 
family members and friends) by high ranking public 
officials 
Illegal sales of state 
land  
 
• Illegal sale of unused state land by private person 
• Illegal sale of unused state land by public official 
• Illegal sale of publicly used state land by public official (or 
rarely by private person) 
• Illegal sale of legally privately used state land by public 
official (or rarely by private person) 
• Illegal sale of illegally privately used state land by public 
official (or rarely by private person) 
Illegal leases of state 
land (including 
concession land, 
forests, mining 
licences etc.) 
 
• Illegal lease of unused state land by private person 
• Illegal lease of unused state land by public official 
• Illegal lease of publicly used state land by public official (or 
rarely by private person) 
• Illegal lease of legally privately used state land by public 
official (or rarely by private person) 
• Illegal lease of illegally privately used state land by public 
official (or rarely by private person) 
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Types Sub-types 
Disputes over 
revenues from state 
land generated 
through lease, sale or 
transformation of its 
use 
• Between public institutions at the same level 
• Between public institutions at different levels 
• Between the state and state officials 
• Between the state and private sector 
• Between state official/customary authority and the public 
Improper land 
privatisation 
• Overlapping claims during restitution (in the case of former 
multiple expropriations/nationalisations) 
• Irregularities during (re)distribution or auctions  
• Illegal applications for land (family/household splitting) 
• Unfair title distribution during legalisation of informal 
settlements 
 
Inheritance and boundary conflicts are probably the most common land 
conflicts. They occur in urban, peri-urban and rural areas alike. Other 
types of conflicts are more specific and predominantly occur in either 
urban, peri-urban or rural areas (see table 2). 
 
Tab. 2: Typical land conflicts in urban, peri-urban and rural areas 
Urban areas Peri-urban areas Rural areas 
• Informal land acquisition 
by squatters or pavement 
dwellers 
• Evictions 
• Land use conflicts: not 
respecting building 
regulations 
• Illegal subdivisions 
resulting in densification 
and slums 
• Illegal sale or lease of 
state land in prime 
locations 
• Illegitimate expropria-
tion by banks of the 
property of the poor  
• Displacement of settlers 
by commercially 
motivated developers or 
speculators 
• Informal land acquisition 
by squatters, often 
through organised group 
squatting 
• Multiple sales of land  
• Illegal sale of state land 
by public officials  
• Expropriation without 
compensation by the 
state of land which is 
perceived to be 
customary land by the 
settlers (Africa) 
• Land use conflicts: not 
respecting building 
regulations 
 
 
• Illegal lease of state land 
for logging, mining, 
agro-industry 
• Land use conflicts 
among farmers and 
pastoralists 
• Land use conflicts 
between conservation 
and private or 
commercial use of 
natural resources 
(forests, lakes etc.) 
• Land grabbing: public 
officials taking state land 
(for themselves or 
friends) 
• Land robbery: guerrillas 
and other violent groups 
taking private land 
• Land clashes between 
different ethnic groups 
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2.2 Causes of land conflicts 
 
The governments of many developing countries and countries in 
transition are currently investing in the improvement of their land 
administration, the primary objective being the development of a 
transparent and efficient land market. As a by-product of this, there is a 
goal of decreasing land conflicts through the implementation of a 
functioning land registration and/or cadastral system. Experience, 
however, shows that more is needed to avoid severe land conflicts than 
surveying, demarcation and land registration. The question therefore 
arises as to the deeper roots of land conflicts and how we can respond to 
them.  
 
 
2.2.1 Shortcomings of the land market and its institutions  
 
 
Economically efficient land markets can cause land conflicts 
 
Not even a perfect, economically efficient land market can prevent land 
conflicts as land market forces alone do not lead to socially and 
ecologically optimal land use patterns. This is because they tend to 
disregard the negative effects of environmental degradation (conversion 
of forests and agricultural land into construction land) and the impact on 
the poor of being pushed out of the land market by so-called market 
evictions. Therefore, in addition to secured property rights, additional 
requirements for an ecologically and socially sustainable land market 
are required, including: 
 
• land management (land use planning, land use regulations, land 
consolidation, land readjustment and land banking), and 
• ethical principles. 
 
Usually the institutions regulating the land market do not work properly, 
but even when they do, land conflicts still regularly occur.  
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Institutions of the land market do not work properly  
 
Two main types of institutions can be distinguished: constitutive and 
regulatory institutions. Constitutive institutions are needed to enable an 
economically efficient land market to work, and include such funda-
mental elements as land rights, land registration and the rule of law. 
Regulatory institutions, on the other hand, provide the ingredients 
necessary to make the land market socially sustainable and environ-
mentally sound such as land management and ethical principles (see 
figure 3). Supportive and complementary institutions such as land valu-
ation and financial mechanisms are no prerequisites for a sustainable 
land market, but facilitate land transfers and correspondingly can limit 
or even provoke land conflicts, as well.  
 
Fig. 3: Institutions of the land market and their role in conflicts 
Indispensable measures   
Key institutions of the land market Political 
will 
Rules and 
regulations 
Implemen-
tation 
Property rights to land 
 
   
Land registration and 
land information 
systems 
   
Constitutive 
institutions: 
 
Provide legal 
security 
 
Rule of law 
   
Supportive 
institutions 
Land valuation    
 
Land management 
   Regulatory 
institutions: 
Provide for 
sustainable land 
use 
 
Ethical principles 
   
Complementary 
institutions 
Financial mechanisms 
(capital markets: credit, 
mortgage) 
   
Source: Wehrmann 2005 (modified) 
 
 
Potential Causes 
 
of 
 
Land Conflicts 
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In most developing countries and transitional economies, many consti-
tutive and regulatory institutions have significant functional deficits. 
Land rights are most often characterized by fragmented or overlapping 
legislation or legal pluralism. This results in unclear property rights and 
consequently conflicts over land ownership. Land administration author-
ities dealing with land registration, land information systems, land use 
planning and land development often lack trained staff, technical infra-
structure and financial resources. Furthermore, administrative services 
tend to be both over-centralised and underdeveloped, with responsibil-
ities often not clearly assigned or overlapping one another, thus im-
peding co-operation and co-ordination. As a result, the little available 
and mostly incomplete or isolated data on land ownership and land use 
is gathered by a variety of non-cooperating institutions, making it 
difficult or even impossible to use properly. Endless procedures and low 
levels of implementation are the result. In addition, many land adminis-
tration authorities are threatened by corruption. Therefore neither 
institutions constituting nor those regulating the land market make a 
substantial contribution to preventing land conflicts. Given their low 
salaries and an openness of the people working within these institutions 
to “motivation payments” they instead contribute to land conflicts.  
 
Legal security is furthermore limited by insufficient implementation of 
rule-of-law principles, while mechanisms for sustainable land 
development suffer from the fact that ethical principles are not broadly 
acknowledged.  
 
For all institutions, the lack of implementation is the crucial point. 
Unclear or non-existent implementation guidelines and contradictory 
legislation worsen the situation. Political will is also very irregular and 
unclear. Generally, it can be concluded that imperfect constitutive land 
market institutions promote land ownership conflicts, while poor 
regulatory institutions are responsible for land ownership as well as land 
use conflicts. 
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2.2.2 The deeper causes of land conflicts  
 
Dysfunctional institutions only act as catalysts for land conflicts – 
selfish individual interests being the deeper causes 
 
It needs to be stressed that the functional deficits of institutions are not 
the core reason for land conflicts; they merely facilitate them. Profit 
maximisation by a multitude of actors is the driving force, manifested 
either by unjustly grabbing land or by excluding disadvantaged sections 
of the population from legally using land. Theoretically, these actors 
include all social gatekeepers. These are people who, because of their 
job, position and faction can manipulate the land market to their 
advantage. Notoriously low wages in the public sector contribute to 
corrupt behaviour by social gatekeepers in the land sector. However, the 
decisive factor for these irregularities is the “normality of misbe-
haviour”. Nepotism, corruption, and disregard for regulations are 
considered normal by the population. Social and religious values are of 
little relevance to everyday life; self-interest is paramount to public 
interest. This underlines the importance of ethical values and rule-of-law 
principles in preventing land conflicts. If individual profit maximisation 
– in the case of widespread absence of functioning institutions – is the 
underlying reason for land ownership conflicts, then a capitalistic land 
market associated with increasing land prices can be seen as a facilitator 
(for as long as land has no monetary value, land ownership conflicts 
occur comparably seldom). In this situation, dysfunctional institutions 
constituting and regulating the land market act merely as catalysts for 
land conflicts – especially in times of institutional change.  
 
 
Psychological fears and desires resulting in emotional and material 
needs are at the root of land conflicts 
 
As with any egoistic behaviour, taking advantage of functional deficits 
for the sake of reckless individual profit maximisation is based on 
emotional and material needs, which again are a consequence of 
psychological fears and desires. Therefore, psychological phenomena 
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form the basis of land conflicts. A typical psychological fear is the fear 
for one’s existence. This fear can result in extreme emotional and 
material needs such as the need for shelter, the longing for survival and 
self-esteem – in some cases resulting in a desire for power – and a 
strong need for independence – often resulting in the accumulation of 
wealth. It is primarily this combination of very strong emotional and 
material needs (seeking power and wealth) that allows people to either 
break rules (institutions) or profit from institutional shortcomings. Land 
conflict resolution should therefore look at the psychological fears and 
desires of those breaking the law or profiting from loopholes – 
especially in those situations where illegal behaviour is the rule rather 
than the exception. This is the case in many post-conflict countries 
where psychological fears and desires and the emotional and material 
needs these provoke – in addition to those needs directly created by the 
conflict itself (e.g. loss of property due to forced displacement) – are 
common phenomena influencing the entire society and its overall 
development. 
 
 
2.2.3 Institutional change as catalyst for land conflicts 
 
Moments or situations of institutional change are conflict prone and 
therefore tend to be phases of increased land conflict. While some forms 
of land conflict can occur under different and even stable institutional 
frame conditions (such as boundary or inheritance conflicts), others 
mainly arise during institutional change (for instance, conflicts due to 
privatisation) or occur much more often and seriously during these times 
(such as market evictions). Some land conflicts are directly linked to the 
nature of the institutional change. Multiple sales – due to legal pluralism 
for instance – are typical for slow institutional changes that lead to the 
overlapping of two systems. Illegal sales of state land, on the other 
hand, are quite common in situations of either abrupt institutional 
change that are marked by a temporary absence of rules (e.g. during the 
transition from a socialist system to democracy) or of the longer-term 
absence of a functioning legitimated institutional frame (e.g. due to civil 
war, dictatorship or institutionalised corruption).  
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2.2.4 Interdependency of causes 
 
Changing frame conditions often provides the basis for land conflicts: 
• Natural disasters can lead to rural-urban migration,  
• Natural population growth can result in an increase in the demand 
for land and consequently of land prices,  
• The introduction of a market economy – giving land a monetary 
value and thereby eradicating traditional ways of land allocation – 
can increase poverty, making it difficult to acquire land legally, and 
last but not least, 
• An institutional change causing a temporary institutional vacuum on 
the land market can generate fears, desires, needs, interests, attitudes 
and opportunities concerning land use and ownership and, because 
these are no longer controlled, can easily lead to land conflicts (see 
figure 4).  
 
Fig. 4: Interdependency of land conflict causes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wehrmann 2005 
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Poverty, institutional change and other changes in society (including 
war and peace) influence each other and provoke strong psychological 
desires and fears (such as the fear for existence or desire to be loved). 
These result in extreme emotional and material needs such as the need 
for shelter, feelings of revenge, the longing for survival and self-esteem 
– in some cases resulting in a need for power – and a strong need for 
independence – often resulting in the accumulation of wealth. Given the 
institutional shortcomings resulting from institutional change and/or 
poverty, these emotional and material needs – sometimes supported by 
sudden opportunities to reap economic profit – result in either taking 
advantage of institutional weaknesses, ignoring formal and/or informal 
institutions or in preventing their (re-)establishment. 
 
Looking at these causes from a different analytical perspective, they can 
also be distinguished by political, economic, socio-economic, socio-cul-
tural, demographic, legal/juridical, administrative, technical (land man-
agement), ecological and psychological causes (see table 3). All of these 
causes are also included in the model presented in figure 4: Political, 
economic, socio-economic, socio-cultural, demographic and ecological 
causes are part of the changing framework. Legal, administrative and 
technical causes are summarised under the institutional shortcomings.  
 
Tab. 3: Causes of land conflicts 
Causes Examples 
Political causes • Change in the political and economic system, including 
nationalisation or privatisation of land 
• Lack of political stability and continuity, lack of predictability  
• Introduction of (foreign, external) institutions that are not 
popularly accepted 
• War/post-war situation, including a high number of former (now 
unemployed) military, para-military, or guerrilla fighters – all 
accustomed to the use of violence 
• Political corruption, state capture and land grabbing 
• Political (and economic) support for big farmers to the 
disadvantage of poorer peasants  
Economic  
causes 
• Evolution of land markets 
• Increasing land prices 
• Limited capital markets 
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Causes Examples 
Socio-economic 
causes 
• Poverty and poverty-related marginalisation/exclusion 
• Extremely unequal distribution of power and resources 
(including land) 
• Lack of microfinance options for the poor 
Socio-cultural 
causes 
• Destroyed or deteriorated traditional values and structures 
• Rejection of formal institutions (new, foreign, external) 
• Low level of education and lack of information on institutions 
and mechanisms of land markets  
• High potential for violence 
• Abuse of power 
• Strong mistrust 
• Helplessness of those disadvantaged 
• Unregistered land transactions 
• Fraud by governmental administration and/or individuals 
• Patronage-system or clientelism 
• Strong hierarchical structure of society 
• Heterogeneous society, weak sense of community or lack of 
identification with society as a whole 
Demographic 
causes 
• Strong population growth and rural exodus  
• New and returning refugees 
Legal and 
juridical causes 
• Legislative loopholes 
• Contradictory legislation 
• Legal pluralism 
• Traditional land law without written records or clearly defined 
plot and village boundaries  
• Formal law which is not sufficiently disseminated or known 
• Limited/no access to law enforcement and jurisdiction by the 
poor/disadvantaged 
• Insufficient establishment of rule-of-law-principles (e.g. lack of 
independent courts) 
• Insufficient implementation of legislation 
• Missing or inactive mechanisms for sanctions  
Administrative 
causes 
• Insufficient implementation of formal regulations 
• Centralisation (e.g. centralised land use planning) 
• Administrative corruption 
• Insufficient control over state land 
• Lack of communication, co-operation, and co-ordination within 
and between different government agencies as well as between 
public and private sector (if existent at all) 
• Lack of responsibility/accountability 
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Causes Examples 
• Limited access to land administration, especially for the poor and 
rural population (distance, illiteracy, costs etc.) 
• Insufficient information to the public 
• Limited/nonexistent public participation, especially in land use 
planning and demarcation of concession land 
• Insufficient staff and technical/financial equipment at public 
agencies 
• Very low wages in the public sector 
• Low qualifications of public employees  
• Missing code of conduct 
• Lack of transparency 
Technical causes • Missing or inaccurate surveying 
• Missing land register (e.g. destroyed) or one that does not meet 
modern requirements 
• Missing, outdated or only sporadic land use planning or planning 
not adapted to local conditions 
• Insufficient provision of construction land 
• Missing housing programs 
Ecological 
causes 
• Erosion/drought/floods leading to urban migration 
• Floods and storms in squatter settlements 
Psychological 
causes 
• Fear for one’s existence 
• Lack of self-esteem 
• Loss of identity 
• Collective suffering 
• Desire for revenge 
• Thirst for power 
Source: Wehrmann 2005 
 
 
2.3 Additional conflict issues 
 
Although land is always the central and obvious conflict issue, land 
conflicts often disguise other societal conflicts. They are often just the 
visible part of a more serious conflict which is rooted much deeper in 
the society and its history. Very often land conflicts only reflect the 
general inequality or unfair distribution of wealth, voice and power in a 
given society and/or the discrimination against certain groups, such as 
women or ethnic minorities. In these cases, it is of crucial importance to 
tackle the main problem and not only to solve the land conflict as new 
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conflicts will arise again and again as long as the bigger conflict 
continues to exist.  
 
Some very striking examples of this are the land conflicts due to legal 
pluralism found all over sub-Saharan Africa. A quite common praxis is 
the sale of state land by customary authorities who claim customary 
rights over the same land. Although fully aware that they are not entitled 
to sell the land (though in some cases they are entitled to use it and/or to 
hold it as a trustee), they do so, thus showing their lack of respect for the 
state as much as for their clan. The land conflict here is only the visible 
part of a traditional culture falling apart and a modern state not being 
accepted by the traditional society (see figure 5).  
 
 
Fig. 5: The broader conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: based on Wehrmann 2005 
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2.4 Consequences of land conflicts 
 
Land ownership conflicts have negative effects on individual house-
holds as well as on the nation’s economy. They increase costs, slow 
down investment, can result in the loss of property for a conflict party 
and reduce tax income (land tax, trade/commercial tax) for the state or 
municipality. The lower the transparency in land markets, the less equal 
is information being disseminated, and the weaker constitutive and 
regulatory institutions are, the more likely it is that land conflicts occur. 
People therefore need to spend a lot of time and money on searching for 
information and monitoring agreements/contracts. This means that land 
conflicts are associated with high transaction and agency costs or vice 
versa, that (relatively) high transaction and agency costs indicate a high 
probability of land conflicts. 
 
Conflicts over the use of land generally have a negative impact on the 
poor or on the natural or building environment. They either decrease 
quality of life for parts of society or, if they are addressed and amelior-
ated, contribute to additional state expenditures and therefore have an 
impact on the national wealth.  
 
Land conflicts also increase social and political instability. Where ever 
there occur a lot of multiple sales, evictions, land grabbing etc., people 
lose confidence in the state and start mistrusting each other. Social and 
political stability suffers even more when land conflicts are accom-
panied by violence. Dealing with land conflicts therefore also means to 
re-establishing trust and confidence in public as well as private institu-
tions.  
 
Box 11: High levels of violence in Guatemala’s land conflicts 
A study of 35 rural land conflicts in the region Verapaces in Guatemala unveiled that 
37% have been accompanied by high levels of violence including murder, personal 
injury and damage to property. In 28% of the conflicts, violence reached middle level 
characterized by dispute, hate, assaults and intimidations. Another 18% of cases were 
marked by low levels of violence such as mistrust, disagreements and lack of patience. 
Only 17% of all land conflicts profited from co-operative relations that were based on 
trust and patience.  
Source: Mentrup 2004 
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Land conflicts affect different groups in different ways. Not only do 
they generally have a stronger impact on the livelihood of the poor than 
that of the rich, but they also impact differently on men and women, 
urban and rural populations, farmers and pastoralists etc., with groups 
such as squatters, ethnic minorities or orphans being extremely 
marginalised. 
 
 
Box 12: Impact of land conflicts on women – an example from Kenya 
In Nakuru District, thousands of families have been internally displaced as a result of 
land conflicts within the past ten years. The families settling in urban areas did not only 
contribute to additional land conflicts there, but also had to find new sources of income 
as the majority of Kenyan families is de facto headed by a woman who mainly depend 
on farming which was impossible to be continued in the new (peri-urban) setting due to 
the lack of own land. Although women discovered other means of earning a livelihood, 
such as hawking, farming on rented land, doing domestic help or prostitution and proved 
to be more innovative and capable in dealing with the changed circumstances than men, 
they were not satisfied at all. To them, owning land (even if it is only indirectly through 
their husband or another male relative) is very important and they would prefer farming 
on their own land to what they are doing today. Their being displaced from their land 
has caused them a lot of social problems due to family disintegration. Land is therefore 
of great importance to family welfare and the women value it, not for the wealth 
accumulation, but as social commodity. Therefore, despite being more innovative and 
capable than most men in dealing with the post-conflict situation (many men simply 
becoming alcoholics), women feel more vulnerable in case of land conflicts as they are 
less socially or financially independent than they have been before.  
Source: Kariuki 2005. 
 
 
2.5 Classification of land conflicts 
 
Among the many different ways of classifying land conflicts 
(Wehrmann 2005) the one based on the social dimension of conflicts is 
the most suitable – especially when it comes to conflict resolution. One 
possibility of classification that conflict research offers in this regard is 
the distinction according to the social level at which a conflict takes 
place: intrapersonal, interpersonal, intrasocietal or intersocietal/inter-
national levels. While in the case of land conflicts the intrapersonal level 
can be ignored the other three levels are very useful for the purpose of 
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classification. Land conflicts within a country will then occur at either 
the interpersonal or intrasocietal level (see table 4).  
 
 
Tab. 4: Classification of land conflicts  
 
Level 
  
 
Dimension 
 
Types of land conflicts (examples) 
Inter-
personal 
level 
Micro-social 
dimension 
• Boundary conflicts between neighbours 
• Ownership conflicts due to inheritance conflicts 
• Occasional multiple sales of private property by 
individuals without administrative assistance and 
without harming third parties 
• Individual occupation of private land 
• Building extensions on the private land of another 
• Illegal lease/sale of somebody else’s private land 
Meso-social 
dimension 
• Boundary conflicts between tribes or villages 
• Illegal sale/lease of communal land/tribal land 
• Illegal allocation of state land by private individual 
• Group invasion of private land 
• Land use conflicts between farmers and pastoralists 
(e.g. animal corridors due to transhumance) 
• Occasional building extension on state land 
• Occasional illegal use of state land 
• Illegal use of one’s own land 
• Violent attacks on property 
Intra-
societal 
level 
Macro-social 
dimension 
• Ownership conflicts due to legal pluralism 
• Land grabbing 
• Illegal sale/lease of state land 
• Evictions (by force) by governmental authorities 
• Improper land privatisation 
• Land use conflicts between private and public util-
isation due to a general disregard of land use regu-
lations by a majority of people 
• Expropriation without compensation 
• Illegal acquisition and sale of somebody else’s 
private property by individuals, supported by corrupt 
public agencies or courts 
• Multiple allocation of particular plots by officers 
working at the land registry 
Source: Wehrmann 2005 
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Another, however quite similar, form of conflict classification is based 
on the social dimension of the conflict, distinguishing between micro-
societal, meso-societal and macro-societal dimensions. While the micro-
societal dimension is equivalent to the interpersonal level, the other two 
allow for a more precise classification of intrasocietal conflicts (see 
table 4).  
 
The classification of land conflicts according to their social dimension 
illustrates the high number and diversity of intrasocietal land conflicts 
compared to interpersonal land conflicts (which, however, does not say 
anything about their absolute numbers). While in most cases inter-
personal land conflicts can be addressed by existing formal or informal 
conflict resolution bodies, intrasocietal conflicts are much more difficult 
to tackle – mainly because conflict resolution mechanisms at the higher 
level are part of the problem. 
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3. ANALYSING LAND CONFLICTS 
 
 
 
 
A first step in land conflict resolution is a thorough analysis of the 
conflict. It is necessary to have a clear and deep understanding of the 
special characteristics of the particular conflict, the causes of the 
conflict and the actors involved (including their positions, attitudes, 
behaviour, interests, needs and motivations), as well as their relations 
with each other. Depending on the complexity of the conflict, frame 
conditions and the historical development of the conflict may have to be 
identified as well.  
 
This chapter provides a checklist with which to identify a conflict’s 
characteristics, as well as tools to structure and visualise information on 
the conflict. In addition, it proposes a way to re-enact the case in order 
to determine the actors’ motivations and to better understand the 
individual parties.   
 
 
3.1 Identifying the characteristics of conflicts 
 
In order to be able to better understand a (land) conflict, it is useful to 
first identify the general characteristics of the conflict: 
 
• Is the conflict more about scarce resources or about norms and 
values? Most land conflicts are about access to or allocation of 
scarce resources, but many also include a struggle over rights, such 
as the fight for a universal or human right to adequate shelter.  
• Is the conflict divisible or indivisible? Only in the case of divisible 
conflicts can a win-win solution be achieved. With respect to land 
conflicts, what needs to be identified is whether the quarrel of the 
conflicting parties is over the same or indivisible property rights 
(e.g. both parties wanting to use the land; or one party wanting to 
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exclude the other – while that party wants to have a right of way) or 
different or divisible ones (e.g. one party wants to use the land while 
the other one wants to have control over how the land is used; or 
two parties want to use the same land at different times). 
• What is the social dimension of the conflict? Is it an interpersonal 
conflict, an intrasocietal one at the meso level or an intrasocietal one 
at the macro level (see 2.5)? An exact appraisal of the conflict’s 
social dimension helps in identifying a suitable form of resolution 
(see 4.2).  
• Is this a latent or a manifest conflict? Latent conflicts most often 
need to be dealt with more sensitively, in order to avoid unnecessary 
escalation. They also often need to be made visible. This applies 
mainly to countries where conflict-avoidance or conflict-denial 
strategies are prevalent (see 4.2.5).  
• Is the conflict symmetric or asymmetric? That is, do the parties have 
the same power and influence in society, or is one side (much) more 
powerful than the other (see 1.3). 
• Finally, an honest appraisal of whether the conflict is antagonistic or 
not must be made. Are the parties irreconcilable and unforgiving or 
are they willing to find a compromise? Many tools for conflict 
resolution such as mediation only work if the conflicting parties are 
open to and co-operative in achieving a trade-off.  
 
 
3.2 Collecting and structuring information on land conflicts  
 
At first glance, most land conflicts seem to be simple and 
straightforward. Some really are. Many, however, are not that easy to 
comprehend. That is, when the second party also tells its side of the 
story, contradictions between that and the first party’s interpretation 
arise and it quickly becomes difficult to tell who is right and who is 
wrong. Therefore, analysing a land conflict always requires listening to 
all parties involved, some of whom are often not easy to identify. To 
understand who is part of the problem, it can be useful to look at the 
land conflict from an historical or chronological perspective. This can 
be done with the help of timelines. These describe the subjective 
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perspectives of the different actors at different times. This is generally 
done by drawing a table that places the opposing points of view in 
columns, side by side. Following the idea of learning histories, this can 
be complemented by another column in which contradictions or turning 
points can be highlighted. Another category which may be added is the 
general frame conditions of the conflict, such as changes in the political 
system, economic crises etc. Table 5 gives an example based on the 
problem of illegal acquisition of state land in peri-urban areas in Turkey 
(also see box 4 on gecekondus). 
 
Tab. 5: Timeline as learning history – the example of the gecekondus 
Year General events Events as 
experienced by 
government 
Events as 
experienced by 
gecekondu 
dwellers 
Comments 
1950s Turkey experiences 
industrialisation, 
mechanisation of 
agriculture, urban-
isation and 
improved 
transportation  
1928 
Municipalities Law 
There are fewer 
jobs in agriculture 
but new urban jobs. 
We move to the 
cities and settle on 
unused available 
land as our fore-
fathers did when 
they needed land.  
Nobody considers 
that the economic 
changes leading to 
migration result in 
a need for  
additional urban 
shelter 
1960s Many migrants to 
the city cannot find 
formal housing. 
The government 
invests in infra-
structure. 
Financial crisis. 
Too many 
inhabitants place 
unmanageable 
burdens on our 
cities. 
1966: Gecekondu 
Law 
The government 
should have 
provided land or 
housing – calling 
us to the cities but 
not providing this. 
Problem: workers 
are wanted but no 
land is provided for 
them. Too many 
are coming at the 
same time. 
1970s The government is 
weak in regard to 
urban control. 
Migrants illegally 
build on state land. 
They should buy or 
lease land. 
The government 
isn’t providing our 
settlements with 
proper infra-
structure. 
There are 
contradictory 
expectations. 
1980s Gecekondus stretch 
over entire districts. 
Some are formal-
ised, while others 
are dismantled.  
Illegal settlements 
on state land have 
to be stopped.  
We are being 
illegally evicted 
without compen-
sation. 
Both sides consider 
the other to be 
acting illegally. 
1990s 
until 
today 
The situation of the 
80s continues, with 
negative impact on 
urban structures & 
living conditions. 
We lose too much 
money in court 
litigation.  
 
Too many people 
are being attacked 
by the police, or 
even being killed 
by them.  
The conflict has 
reached the level of 
violence. 
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Once the details of a conflict’s development over time are known, its 
different stages can be identified. This allows the current degree of 
intensity of a conflict to be determined, perhaps showing that it is just 
before escalation so that urgent actions are needed, for instance. Figure 
6 shows the typical stages of a conflict. The conflicts over gecekondus 
are currently at stage 2 (confrontation) and close to crisis. 
 
Fig. 6: Stages of conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fisher et al. 2000 (modified) 
 
The stages of conflict reflect the changes in activity, intensity, tension 
and violence of conflicts over time, from the first moments of tension to 
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the total destruction of the enemy, which often results in self-destruction 
as well. Although each conflict has its own dynamic, every conflict goes 
through at least three phases: pre-conflict, in-conflict or crisis, and post-
conflict. In conflict management, these three phases are looked at in 
even more detail. Fisher et al. (2000) in fact identify five phases: 
• Pre-conflict: A conflict generally starts with an incompatibility 
between the goals of two or more parties, which has the potential to 
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general view, although one or more of the parties is probably aware 
of the potential for confrontation. There may be tension between the 
parties who often try to avoid each other at this point. 
E 
S 
C 
A 
L 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N TIME 
IN-CONFLICT PRE-
CONFLICT 
POST-CONFLICT 
Crisis 
Outcome 
Confrontation 
                                                                           Analysing Land Conflicts 
 39 
• Confrontation: The second phase of a conflict is more open and 
marked by occasional fighting or other low levels of violence. Each 
side is looking for resources and supporters. Polarisation between 
the parties increases. 
• Crisis: At this level the conflict is at its peak. When the tension 
and/or violence are most intense a conflict can easily get out of 
control. There is now rarely any communication between the parties, 
who are fighting with and publicly accusing each other. In worst 
case, the different sides are at war. 
• Outcome: In one way or another, the crisis will end. One party may 
defeat the other or give in, both parties may agree to negotiate, or a 
third party may impose a settlement. In any case, tension and 
violence decrease but the conflict is not yet settled. 
• Post-conflict: At this stage, relations have become more normal 
again. However, if the roots of the conflict have not been adequately 
addressed and if the incompatible goals still prevail, chances are 
good that the situation will turn again into a pre-conflict. 
 
It is very important to identify the current stage of the conflict in order to 
be able to choose the appropriate manner of intervention or dispute 
resolution (see 4.2).  
 
More information about the actors can be found by completing or 
“peeling” the conflict onion – identifying their positions, interests and 
needs, as well as their desires and fears (see figure 7) 
 
Fig 7: Conflict Onion 
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Tab. 6: Actors and their positions, interests, needs, desires and fears –  
 the case of multiple sales of land in Accra, Ghana (see box 3) 
 
Conflict 
party 
Position  Interest Needs Desires and 
fears 
Real estate 
agent  
(who bought 
from former 
Anwahia 
chief) 
It’s my land. To settle the 
conflict as 
soon as pos-
sible to be able 
to develop and 
resell the land. 
Material need: 
to make 
money/do 
business. 
Fear for 
existence (if 
money and 
land are lost). 
Desire for 
wealth. 
Home-builder 
(who bought 
from current 
Anwahia 
chief) 
It’s my land. To keep the 
land to start 
building his 
house. 
Material need: 
shelter. 
Fear for 
existence (if 
money and 
land are lost). 
Anwahia chief 
(junior)  
It’s no longer 
my business. 
To not be 
bothered. 
Material need: 
money. 
Desire for 
wealth and 
status. 
Katamanso 
chief  
(who lent the 
land to the 
former 
Anwahia 
chief) 
It’s my land. To get back 
his land for his 
people. 
Material need: 
the land of his 
people. 
Emotional 
need: the land 
of his 
ancestors. 
Fear of loos of 
the love and 
respect of his 
people. 
 
 
Once the interests, needs, desires, and fears of the parties involved in the 
conflict have been identified, it becomes easier to find ways out of the 
conflict. Someone who wants money or status does not necessarily need 
this particular piece of land, or indeed any land at all. His desires and 
needs may be met in other ways. However, someone whose existence is 
in danger because he has nothing other than this piece of land definitely 
needs land, although not necessarily this exact piece, so long as the 
alternative is located in an acceptable location (e.g. at an acceptable 
distance from formal or informal job opportunities). But if emotional 
needs are involved and people are especially attached to a given piece of 
land because it has special meaning for them, this must be taken into 
account.  
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Now, one could ask why anyone who has clearly acted against the law 
should be negotiated with or compensated. Well, first because some-
times the law does not really leave people a choice. Second, even if the 
action as a whole is not legitimate, this illegitimately acting conflict 
party may be so powerful that the conflict can only be resolved by 
negotiations in which concessions are made to it, providing the other 
party or parties with something that is still better than nothing. Sanctions 
and punishment for those who have done wrong and acted without any 
legitimacy only work in countries with a functioning judiciary that is 
completely free from any corruption or undue influence of the powerful.  
 
Another matrix can be prepared to list and structure the additional 
information on the conflict, and to verify which details are still missing. 
Categories here are the causes of the conflict, the conflict issue, its 
manifestation, possible additional risks or dangers, potential, and 
possible solutions (see table 7). 
 
 
Tab. 7: Conflict matrix – the case of an illegal sale of state land 
Type of conflict: Illegal sale of state land by public official 
Conflict issue: Misuse of position 
Manifestation of 
conflict: 
Conflict escalated into violence when new private owner 
stopped local population from using the land (forest which 
was used for hunting, gathering, firewood collection, bee 
keeping etc.) – villagers promised revenge.  
Stakeholders: Public official, new owner, local population, judge, 
environmental NGO 
Causes: Corruption, lack of demarcation of state land, a lack of 
recognition and registration of common property by the 
state (who considers it state property) 
Potential:  To introduce/improve good governance  
Risks: Upheaval and violent attacks by the villagers – brutal 
responses from the investor.  
Possible solutions: Sanctions for corrupt official and retrieval of state land 
(difficult to achieve) 
User contract between local population and private investor 
(could become a win-win solution providing long-term 
security for the villagers and reducing risks of sabotage for 
the investor) 
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3.3 Visualising land conflicts  
 
Visualising a land conflict is especially helpful if the conflict is analysed 
together with one or even several of the conflict parties. Visualisation 
facilitates the discussion about the conflict, its causes and possible ways 
of resolving it. The two most rewarding issues to be visualised in this 
context are the conflict causes and consequences – using a conflict tree 
– and the relations between the actors – through creating a conflict map.  
 
Fig. 8: Conflict tree showing core problem, causes and consequences –  
the case of Diamond Island in Phnom Penh, Cambodia 
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The small island in Basack River along which the Cambodian capital 
Phnom Penh spreads out has not received a lot of attention during most 
of its existence. Recently, though, it was renamed Diamond Island 
(previously Leprosy Island), showing not only its sudden value but also 
reflecting the many facets of the conflict that surround it. The island is 
state property that had been given to a group of farmers to collectively 
cultivate it in 1979 by the chief of one of the districts facing it from one 
side of the river. The farmers appointed a village chief and have lived 
and worked there ever since. Lately, several additional actors have 
appeared on the scene however. An investor wants to develop the island 
and sell luxury houses, making a good profit. One of the local banks that 
is also known as real estate company wants to do the same. Rumours 
suggest that the bank has already “bought” a lease contract for 99 years. 
The Mekong River Authority, on the other hand, insists that the island 
has to be removed as it is creating floods upstream that can become 
dangerous for many people living along the river. The removal of at 
least part of the island would comply with the need of the Municipality 
of Phnom Penh to construct a dam along the river, for which the sand of 
the island could be used. They therefore favour the partial removal of 
the island, leaving the remaining part to the investor. The Council of 
Development of Cambodia is prepared to agree to the investor’s plans as 
soon as the flooding problem is solved. According to the 2001 Land 
Law, the land belongs to the farmers as they had been living on the land 
for (much!) longer than 5 years prior to 2001, which is the minimum 
time someone has to have occupied a piece of land to become the owner 
of it now that private property has been reintroduced. The conflict tree 
(figure 8) illustrates the key causes of the conflict: peace and the 
reintroduction of democracy and a market economy have contributed to 
an increase in land values. A major political or economic transition 
always creates institutional change and this means that there are – 
temporarily – loopholes in the institutional frame. Many issues have not 
yet been tackled and other rules are not yet known by the majority of 
people. In addition, while there is greed in any society, here it finds 
fertile ground to grow in the unequal distribution of power. The 
combination of openness for illicit practises, a weak institutional frame 
and the opportunity to make high profits from speculation results in a 
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large-scale disregard for rules and regulations. The core problem 
therefore is to be found in this wilful disregard for the institutional 
frame. Possible consequences of the conflict are economic, socio-
economic and ecological ones – depending on how it is solved. [In the 
end, the local Bank and Real Estate Company developed the island.] 
 
So, a conflict tree raises awareness of the deeper causes of the conflict 
as well as its current and possible additional consequences. It can there-
fore be used to support decision-making, by identifying the most urgent 
or most relevant causes to be addressed. The conflict tree does not 
provide additional information but it does help to reflect what additional 
causes might be at the root of the conflict.  
 
In addition to a conflict tree, a conflict map can be used to illustrate the 
actors’ relations to one another. This allows for the identification of 
alliances as well as of potential blockers of a solution. Figure 9 shows 
the interrelations of the actors involved in the conflict over Diamond 
Island. 
 
Fig. 9: Conflict map – the case of Diamond Island 
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3.4 Re-enacting land conflicts 
 
Generally, we don’t get all the information required to see the whole 
picture of the conflict just by talking and listening to the parties or by 
interviewing technical experts, local leaders and other stakeholders and 
informants. What we most often don’t learn from them are the 
motivations and feelings of the conflict parties, their material and 
emotional needs or their fears and desires.  
 
Role-play can contribute a lot toward gaining insight into these deeper 
roots of a land conflict. These are not typical role-plays, however, where 
the actors have to study their roles in advance and learn their lines by 
heart. It is more like improvisation. It’s called socio-drama. A socio-
drama focuses on a social problem or a social conflict. It therefore aims 
to work out interpersonal relations and the feelings and needs on which 
they are based. The roles are more like representative characters of a 
given society than private persons. The idea is that every society 
disposes of a particular set of roles out of which each person represents 
a certain combination. Someone playing “the president” or “the farmer” 
is playing a person characterised by well-known roles; roles which the 
actor also incorporates in his/her sub-consciousness and which will be 
addressed and sorted during the improvisation (Moreno 1989, Jüngst/ 
Meder 1991). 
 
What is needed for a socio-drama? The basic requirements are a stage 
(e.g. a room or free space), actors, spectators and a director who directs 
the play, questions scenes, intervenes in the play, adds new roles and 
analyses what is happening. The spectators can assist him and the 
actors. It is very useful if an additional person can document the differ-
ent stages or scenes by illustrating them on a board. This visualisation 
allows for a joint analysis of the play after the performance, to ensure 
that everybody realises what was happening and to check whether all 
participants (actors, spectators, director, documenting person) experi-
enced the situation in the same way. In case of disagreement, individual 
scenes can be played again with other actors. Experience, however, 
shows that there is high consistency in how people experience the play.  
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How does a socio-drama work? First, the director explains the initial 
situation and the roles involved in the conflict. Then actors are chosen to 
play the characters who participated in the initial situation. These have 
to choose a place and position on the stage that corresponds or illustrates 
the situation at the outset. Their physical positions, their gestures and 
their viewing direction already characterise – often subconsciously – 
their inner positions. In their roles, the actors talk and react to each 
other. They can move and act freely. The most important thing is to 
react spontaneously and by intuition, without reflecting on the 
consequences, as this shows best the inner position of the characters. 
The director can stop them at any time and ask them about their 
feelings. The more spontaneously the actors answer and speak about 
their feelings, the more authentic their words normally are (Aissen-
Crewett 1999).  
 
The reactions revealed during the play and the fantasies that develop 
and are expressed should all be considered part of the collective 
knowledge of that society and its specific forms of relations and ways of 
interacting. Correspondingly, the socio-drama allows the participants to 
experience and to act out typical needs, fears, desires, frustrations and 
expectations. It can therefore contribute a lot of additional insight to 
land conflicts.  
Socio-drama can equally be used to analyse a land conflict or – if 
practised together with the involved stakeholders (letting them act out 
the opponent’s part, or letting them watch the play acted out by others 
who are not involved in the real conflict) – to solve the conflict by 
increasing the awareness of the other party’s feelings and needs and to 
rectify their perception of the other party’s positions and interests. 
 
The documentation of the play should be done in the form of 
sociograms or conflict maps capturing all key situations and turning 
points. Figure 10 illustrates how the perception of a land conflict 
changed during a socio-drama. The conflict in Northern Ethiopia is 
mainly about the use of a state forest. But is it really only about land? 
The long-established local population wants to continue using the forest 
for beekeeping and is angry with the new farmers who are cutting down 
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the native plants and flowers under the trees to replace them with coffee 
plants for their coffee production. The coffee producers, on the other 
hand, want the pastoralists to stay out of the forest but these have long-
established rights to seasonal use, much as the beekeepers rely on their 
customary rights. The coffee producers, however, pay taxes to the 
Ministry of Finance (who is not even the institution responsible for 
collecting this kind of tax) and therefore also feel themselves to have 
legitimate usage rights to the land. The Finance Ministry and the coffee 
producers are under attack by the District Natural Resources 
Conservation Office, which wants to protect the forest in order to 
stabilize the watershed in that area and protect biodiversity, as well as to 
maintain its influence on the management of the forest.  
 
Fig. 10: Scene from a socio-drama about a forest use conflict in Ethiopia 
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everyone (state land resulting in a de facto open access situation). He 
expressed feeling afraid and insecure. He even asked the long-
established population to take care of him – without receiving an 
answer. While the play continued, the forest suddenly claimed that he 
felt mistreated and left the scene. The interesting point is that the 
conflict continued. Beekeepers blamed the Ministry of Finance for not 
respecting their traditional rights and culture. Pastoralists accused the 
District Natural Resources Conservation Office of offending their 
dignity by not respecting their tradition(al rights). Beekeepers and 
coffee producers called each other old-fashioned respectively ignorant 
towards their culture. Thus, the conflict over land and forest use quickly 
became a conflict between traditional and modern culture that also 
touched upon aspects of respect and dignity. This conflict has much 
deeper roots than the current superficial one over forest use would 
suggest. The problem is that the cultural issues are part of the forest 
conflict and that this conflict will only be resolved if an answer to the 
socio-cultural conflict is found as well. Socio-dramas are immensely 
useful for revealing additional conflict issues. 
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4. DEALING WITH LAND CONFLICTS 
 
 
 
 
How to deal with a land conflict depends first of all on the current stage 
of its process (see 3.2, figures 6 and 11). That is, depending on the stage 
of the conflict, the emphasis chosen to assist in its resolution may be 
more on crisis prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding, 
each of which requires different tools and different methods of conflict 
resolution (see 4.2). 
 
Fig. 11: Stages of conflict and approaches of intervention 
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4.1 Uncovering hidden land conflicts 
 
People – especially those in a position to improve the situation – often 
ignore land conflicts until they cannot be overlooked any longer, as 
tension and violence rise to a level which threatens major parts of 
society. However, many land conflicts linger for years in a state of pre-
conflict or early conflict characterized by tense instability and repeated 
confrontation which each time raise the average level of tension. 
Intervention should start here, avoiding the crisis that may come and 
finding a realistic solution for all parties. Of course, this is only possible 
so long as no party has totally lost face or been entirely destroyed by the 
other.  
 
This, however, requires that the latent land conflict first has to be 
uncovered and intentionally named. While everybody may talk about it 
in private, the issue might not be publicly addressed or, if it is, it may be 
ignored by those responsible for it. In all cases, two approaches are 
necessary: first, proper documentation of as many land conflicts (cases) 
as possible and second, widespread dissemination of information on 
them. NGOs as well as land administration can play a major role in this 
process. 
 
Documentation can be compiled in different ways: National Human 
Rights Commissions often have detailed accounts of violent land 
conflicts such as evictions. NGOs sometimes gather information and 
publish lists of all land conflicts (cases) within a country or a given area, 
identifying the conflict issue, its parties and the attempts and failures to 
solve it. Land administrations can create GIS-related databases, not only 
describing the type of conflict but also indicating the location and size 
of the property/properties involved. 
 
Documenting land conflicts will only have an effect if the findings are 
then spread widely through society. In the case of state capture, or 
evictions and other unjustified land conflicts initiated by the state or its 
public officials, those responsible need to be identified in the 
documentation.  
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In 2003, the Kenyan President Kibaki appointed 20 prominent citizens, 
lawyers and civil servants drawn from ministries particularly concerned 
with land to be members of the Ndungu Commission, which was 
assigned to prepare a report on illegal and irregular allocation of public 
land. In the “Ndungu Report”, the Commission categorised its findings 
according to three groups of public land: i) urban, state and ministerial 
land, ii) settlement schemes and trust land, and iii) forestland, national 
parks, game reserves, wetlands, riparian reserves and protected areas. 
The report is not shy about stating what everybody already knew:  
 
“Land was no longer allocated for development purposes 
but as political reward and for speculation purposes... Land 
grabbing became part and parcel of official grand 
corruption through which land meant for public purpose has 
been acquired by individuals and corporations… Instead of 
playing their role as custodians of public resources in-
cluding land, county and municipal councils have posed the 
greatest danger to these resources… The most pronounced 
land grabbers in these areas were the councillors 
themselves… The corruption within the central government 
has been replicated at the local level through the activities 
and omissions of county and municipal councils” (Republic 
of Kenya 2004: 8; 147). 
 
Although the report has been criticised because it does not name the 
public officials who have been involved in the illegal allocation of state 
land, and its recommendations lack implementation, the report itself can 
be considered a milestone in the fight against state capture, because:  
• The report officially recognises the existence of extensive land 
grabbing by public officials; 
• It describes the vast spectrum of irregular allocations of public land; 
• It identifies the beneficiaries as well as the location and size of the 
land they received; 
• It makes a series of sensible recommendations to be considered and 
implemented, including the introduction of an inventory of public 
land, the computerisation of land records, the need for a 
Land Conflicts                                                                                          4 
 52 
comprehensive land policy and the establishment of a Land Titles 
Tribunal charged with reviewing every case of suspected illegally or 
irregularly allocated land.  
 
It would probably be overly optimistic or even naïve to assume that all 
or major parts of these state lands could be regained by the state. But the 
Ndungu Report achieved one important thing: Today’s public officials 
are much more reluctant to do what their predecessors did. Moral and 
ethical conduct seems to have improved significantly.  
 
CHECKLIST: What should be included in a national report on the 
irregular allocation of state land? 
1. A critical overview on the legal frame of state land management 
2. An overview of all different types of irregular allocation of state 
land (eventually grouped according to the type of state land) 
3. Identification of the extent of irregularly allocated state land 
over the past 10-20 years (in both hectares and as a percentage) 
4. Identification/documentation of the location of those lands 
5. A list of all beneficiaries and public officials involved, 
preferably by name and otherwise by institution, to give at least 
an overview of the offices/authorities involved  
6. An estimation of the value of the irregularly allocated lands and 
calculation of the total loss (monetary amount) of state property. 
7. Recommendations for appropriate measures for the restoration 
of illegally allocated lands to their proper purpose, as well as for 
prevention of future illegal allocations and for appropriate 
criminal prosecutions 
 
The launching of this report should be accompanied by additional 
supporting measures to establish control of and pressure on the land 
administration and anti-corruption activities within the land 
administration and land-related ministries. These might include: 
• Media campaigns, 
• Introduction and/or application of a code of conduct, 
• Introduction and/or application of intra-institutional sanctions for 
corruption, 
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• Publicly displaying posters and signs claiming “corruption free 
zones” and providing reminders of ethics, responsibilities and 
sanctions, 
• Distribution of leaflets to the entire staff warning about corruption. 
 
Not all governments are this open to addressing the issue of their own 
illegal allocations of state land. Most governments still ignore or even 
deny such accusations. In this case, there might be few alternatives to a 
public denunciation by civil society.  
 
Box 13: Sold! Public campaign against illegal allocation of state land in 
Cambodia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once land conflicts are identified and brought to the level of discussion, 
their settlement can be started. This can involve classical or alternative 
ways of conflict resolution, special land tribunals, land management 
measures, special local contracts, land conflict resolution by the victims 
and land governance.  
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4.2 Choosing a suitable form of conflict resolution 
 
Depending on the degree of escalation present, eight strategies of 
conflict resolution are recommended (Glasl 1999, modified): 
1. Facilitation: The facilitator helps the parties come together, the 
parties still being able to solve the problem by themselves. 
Facilitation can be applied in a very early stage of pre-conflict 
to defuse the conflict in time and avoid escalation.  
2. Moderation: The moderator helps the parties come together to 
clarify and settle minor differences, the parties still being able to 
solve the problem by themselves. Moderation can be applied in 
a pre-conflict situation to defuse the conflict in time and avoid 
escalation. 
3. Consultation: The “tutor” accompanies the process, working on 
the deeply internalised perceptions, attitudes, intentions and 
behaviours of the parties in order to calm them. Consultation is 
yet another approach useful during the stage of pre-conflict to 
stop the conflict progressing toward becoming a full-blown 
crisis. It is more appropriate than simple moderation in a case 
where a latent conflict has manifested itself for a longer time 
and has already created prejudices and hostility. 
4. Socio-therapeutic consultation: This special form of consult-
ation focuses explicitly on destructive, dysfunctional or neurotic 
behaviour due to psychological damages caused by former 
negative experiences in life. Socio-therapeutic consultation is 
extremely helpful if the parties involved have already lost face 
during the processes of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-
building, as it helps in the understanding of one own behaviour 
as well as that of one’s opponent, and therefore creates under-
standing and a willingness to forgive one another.  
5. Conciliation: This is a mixture of consultation and mediation. 
The conciliator helps the parties to negotiate while – whenever 
necessary – addressing internalised perceptions, attitudes, inten-
tions and behaviours with the objective of reducing prejudices 
and hostility. Conciliation can be applied in pre-conflict and 
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early conflict situations as long as the parties are able to talk to 
each other. 
6. Mediation: Mediation, too, requires that the parties are willing 
to face each other and to find a compromise. The mediator 
follows a strict procedure, giving each party the opportunity to 
explain its perceptions and to express its feelings, forcing the 
other party to listen and finally moderating a discussion aimed 
at finding a solution with which both parties can live. 
Preferably, the moderator should not propose solutions but may 
lead the way towards them. At the end, a written contract is 
signed by all parties and the mediator seals the agreement. 
Mediation can be done in any situation as long as the parties are 
willing to find a compromise. 
7. Arbitration: Arbitration follows strict rules too. Unlike the 
moderator, however, the arbitrator is expected to make direct 
suggestions on how to settle the conflict. He is more influential 
and powerful than moderators, tutors or mediators. He has 
decision-making authority. Therefore, arbitration can be used 
even at the peak of a conflict. What makes it different from 
adjudication is that the arbitrators are accepted and trusted by 
both parties. The arbitrator may be appointed by all conflicting 
parties or be a respected person traditionally responsible for 
dispute settlement.  
8. Decision by a powerful authority (adjudication) should 
always remain the last resort.  
 
Fig. 12: Strategies of conflict resolution and influence of third party 
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In the case of moderation, consultation, conciliation, negotiation and 
mediation the third party helping to resolve the land conflict only 
influences the process, not the outcome. These are all consensual 
approaches where the outcome is exclusively defined by the parties. 
Only in the non-consensual approaches of arbitration and adjudication is 
the outcome defined by the third party (figure 12). 
 
Fig. 13: Stages of conflict and possible methods of dispute resolution 
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While land conflicts taking place at the micro and meso social level can 
normally be addressed by any of these means of conflict resolution 
(although this may depend on the stage of conflict, the degree of 
escalation and the (a)symmetry of the conflict), land conflicts occurring 
at the macro social level often cannot as they require additional 
institutional changes before the conflict can be settled. 
 
 
4.2.1 Consensual approaches 
 
Consensual approaches are those conflict resolution strategies which 
aim to find a compromise that is acceptable to all parties involved and 
which can best re-establish peace, respect and even friendship among 
the parties. Consensual approaches therefore try to find a consensus 
among the conflict parties through intensive discussions and negoti-
ations, during which all sides learn to understand the other party’s/ 
parties’ interests, motivations, (hurt) feelings and eventually even their 
fears and desires. Such dialogues also help to identify earlier conflicts, 
reasons for mistrust or revenge, as well as additional conflict issues 
which might even be the primary conflict, or in any event a more 
important one than the conflict over land. In a way, all consensual 
approaches are negotiations that aim to re-establish a positively func-
tioning relationship and to agree on terms for future interaction. 
Generally – but not necessarily – approaches for facilitating the building 
of consensus require a professional third party.  
 
Consensual approaches are: moderation, consultation, socio-therapeut-
ical consultation, conciliation and mediation. They are generally faster 
and cheaper than non-consensual approaches and therefore often a 
preferable alternative to using overloaded courts. 
 
In a very early stage of pre-conflict, when coalitions have not yet 
formed, it can be helpful to support the disadvantaged parties in organ-
ising themselves. Examples include widely scattered small groups of 
informal settlers facing violent eviction or small groups/villages of 
ethnic minorities who are forced to leave mountainous regions where 
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they have been living for generations and to resettle in valleys where 
there is hardly enough agricultural land for the rapidly growing 
population already living there. In these early but often chronic 
situations of pre-conflict a third party can help the disadvantaged 
individuals affected – who share the same destiny and therefore the 
same goal in this conflict situation – to organise into a unified group. 
This can contribute to the empowerment of that group prior to any 
negotiations with the other party or parties involved. 
 
In case of a symmetric conflict, an unaccompanied negotiation can be 
tried. In this case the parties together discuss the issue without the 
presence of a third party. Many boundary conflicts can be solved in this 
way. It is often sufficient in such a conflict if one party addresses the 
other in a friendly way, inviting it to talk and listen with the objective of 
finding a mutually acceptable solution.  
 
If none of the parties is willing or able to take the first step – quite often 
because of a lack of courage due to all the insults that have already been 
exchanged – it can be helpful if a third party simply tries to facilitate a 
meeting without being present at it. In that case, the third party – who 
can be an elder, a village chief, a religious or neighbourhood leader, a 
village teacher or any other respected person in the area – individually 
addresses the conflicting parties and proposes a meeting (time and 
place). If the parties prefer the third party to be present during their 
meeting, s/he can moderate the discussion or negotiation and thereby 
assure both parties that they will have the chance to explain their points 
of view. Moderation can easily become a mediation which, however, 
demands a little bit more experience by the moderator – or in that case 
mediator. 
 
Non-violent, rather unemotional micro and meso social conflicts such as 
boundary conflicts, illegal subdivisions, and the illegal use of land that 
violates building regulations might be solved this way. If strong 
emotions (as is generally the case with inheritance conflicts) or violence 
are involved, an active third party normally becomes necessary, as here 
the parties have to be conciliated. In such a situation the first step would 
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be consultation with both parties, trying to identify the wounded 
feelings and discussing the conflict with each party separately, with the 
aim of creating some understanding of the other side’s position. In the 
case of conciliation, the third party becomes a kind of intermediary 
between the conflicting parties, who attempts to establish the basis for a 
joint meeting of the parties.  
 
Fig. 14: The role of a mediator 
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supposed to take a decision. The decision-making is entirely the respon-
sibility of the conflicting parties, in order to increase ownership of the 
outcome. The mediator might be allowed to suggest solutions, but this 
has to be agreed upon before the mediation starts.  
 
Mediation can be carried out by professional mediators or by land ex-
perts who have received a special training in mediation, such as land 
officers in special departments dealing with land conflicts. The exact 
nature of the conflict determines whether a higher degree of profession-
alism in moderation or more detailed insight into land issues is needed. 
In the USA, mediation is quite commonly used to settle land use con-
flicts (see box 14). 
 
Box 14: Mediation between the homeless and the business community 
in the USA 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, homelessness became a major problem in 
West Chester, Pennsylvania. The charitable community therefore set up the 
non-profit organisation “Safe Harbor” offering temporary shelter, meals and 
counselling. They were however heavily handicapped by the lack of permanent 
facility. In spring 1994, Safe Harbor located an abandoned auto-repair garage in 
a slightly run-down part of the town. The site was properly zoned for commer-
cial purposes necessary for operation of a homeless shelter in downtown West 
Chester, where the county’s homeless problem was most acute. However, it 
was near the newly prosperous shopping and restaurant district. Therefore, the 
business community, the owner of a rental apartment house across the street 
and even the mayor objected to the plans. What followed were some fruitless 
attempts of Safe Harbor to garner support (holding breakfast meetings with 
representatives of the business community). Although from the legal point of 
view Safe Harbor was allowed to pursue their plan, it was obvious that the 
antagonistic climate would not stop.  
 
During the summer of 1994, tercentenary celebrations of Pennsylvania’s early 
colonial history were fresh in people’s minds. Seizing the opportunity, the 
County Commissioner referred to the ideals of tolerance, mutual support and 
peace under which Pennsylvania was founded and proposed to apply similar 
values to the Safe Harbor dispute. Mediation was started. The objective was not 
to clear the way for the shelter (as its establishment was a foregone conclusion), 
but to overcome the general objection to its establishment – much of it based on 
stereotypes – and perhaps generate support among members of the opposition. 
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Drawing upon interviews with elected officials, leaders of the business 
community and members of the Safe Harbor coalition, the mediator devised a 
mediation process that would consist of four sessions, held from September to 
December of 1994. The main session were supposed to be interspersed with 
private, one-on-one meetings with key representatives of the two parties, in 
which more detailed concerns could be discussed and addressed. The Borough 
of West Chester (responsible for local land use planning as well as security 
issues) participated in the mediation through a representative of the police 
department.  
 
1st session:  
To cultivate a climate of honesty and openness, the moderators devoted the first 
session to an expression of concerns, fears and motivations regarding the 
shelter. Each party had a chance to speak freely without interruption. Everyone 
began to understand what each other’s issues and interests really were. The 
downtown-business participants expressed concerns regarding increased loiter-
ing, begging and crime – all bad for business.  
 
2nd session:  
To address these concerns, the next mediated session featured representatives 
of homeless shelters and their neighbouring business communities from Harris-
burg and Philadelphia. Having these representatives of other shelters visit and 
share their experiences was a milestone; after they explained the way their 
successful shelters ran; most fears of the business community had been taken 
away. The active participation of the police officer with his insightful 
philosophy of both law enforcement and local governance also contributed to a 
reduction of fears and concerns. 
 
3rd session:  
As the leader of the business community, however, remained unsatisfied, the 
third session started with an individual talk with him where he could talk 
confidentially and off the record with the mediators who learned that he simply 
was against the shelter because he believed that it would only offer shelter and 
food and no other services urgently needed for those people to have a chance of 
reintegration. The fear was based on the experience of a close friend who be-
came homeless as a result of mental illness triggered by service in the Vietnam 
War and who now lived in such an inhuman shelter. After he had talked with 
the moderators he agreed to share his thoughts and feelings with the rest of the 
group. His comments prompted a discussion of the Safe Harbor counselling and 
intervention model, including referral to other services and treatment. 
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4th session:  
The final session focussed on the detailed programs and strategies, a work plan 
and budget. The most important contribution was the “Statement of Commit-
ment to the Community” drafted by Safe Harbor and addressing downtown 
safety and liveability concerns repeatedly raised by the business community 
during the mediation. From its preamble: “Safe Harbor strives to provide an 
adequately staffed homeless shelter which will be a source of pride to the busi-
ness and residential communities.” 
 
At the initiation of the mediation process, the settlement profited from 
favourable frame conditions. It was Christmas season. So the parties agreed to a 
settlement on December 21, 1994 in the seasonal spirit of goodwill and charity.  
 
The costs of this mediation accounted for less than $ 2,000 and have been paid 
for by the county. When the case study was prepared in 1999, Safe Harbor 
Shelter included 24-hour accessibility for people in distress, shelter, feeding, 
counselling and access to other rehabilitative services necessary to enable 
clients to re-enter independent and productive life. 
 
Although this mediation looks very one-sided, it offers a lot of insights on the 
mechanism of mediation and the many psychological aspects involved: 
Participants are allowed to yell and scream, they are invited to admit their fears 
and their voices are heard and taken seriously. It’s the mediator’s job to offer a 
safe place to speak frankly, ensure a climate of uncompromised confidentiality, 
and operate with complete neutrality. The best start is to ascertain what each 
stakeholder hopes to gain through a settlement. Thus, the mediated process 
itself becomes an exercise by which the parties begin to appreciate the benefits 
of an agreement. Looked at from this perspective, this mediation was much less 
one-sided. The business community finally accepts the project. In exchange, 
they were relieved from their fears and received the assurance that none of their 
concerns would become true. Safe Harbor definitely has more duties to perform 
than without the mediation, but they can now act in a climate of support instead 
of hostility. They even gained additional ideas for their project. The case study 
also underlines that the rules for mediation are flexible. They can include other 
elements such as the invitation of a peer group if this offers a chance to 
contribute to the settlement of the land conflict. 
 
 
Source: Lampe/Kaplan 1999 [The Paper offers 8 detailed case studies on resolving land 
use conflicts through mediation in the USA and is available at: www.lincolninst.edu] 
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Fig. 15: Successful mediation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dokumentation und Transfer 2007 (www.informdoku.de) 
 
 
In practise, consensual approaches are often mixed ones and include 
elements of the different approaches. In a number of countries, state 
officials at the land administration are involved in the informal settle-
ment of disputes over land using anything from facilitation to mediation. 
In some cases there are even specialized committees to deal with certain 
kinds of land conflicts. In Ghana for instance, the Land Title Adjudica-
tion Committee and the Stool Lands Boundary Settlement Committee 
offer to deal with land conflicts before they get to court or after a court 
decision has failed to end a conflict. In Cambodia, Cadastral Commis-
sions at the municipal, provincial and national level are charged with the 
resolution of land conflicts, although they do not seem to be any fairer 
than the courts. 
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Fig. 16: The role of facilitators, moderators, conciliators and mediators 
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Consensual approaches are also known as Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution (ADR) as they are an alternative both to litigation in the courts as 
well as to customary conflict resolution. Even arbitration is considered 
to be an alternative dispute resolution.  
 
Box 15: Alternative dispute resolution for solving land conflicts in Ghana 
In Ghana, not less than eight options of alternative dispute resolution have 
been identified for dealing with land conflicts: 
• Informal arbitration by “respected persons”; 
• State-sponsored alternative dispute resolution to encourage out-of-
court settlements; 
• Court-annexed alternative dispute resolution by judges, explicitly for 
land related cases; 
• Special committees at the land administration to deal with specific 
types of land conflicts (Land Title Adjudication Committee/Stool 
Lands Boundary Settlement Committee); 
• Informal land conflict settlement by land management experts who 
are usually members of the Ghana Institution of Surveyors; 
• Informal land conflict settlement by state officials such as elected 
officials; 
• Religious (Islamic) courts where land disputes are resolved by 
religious leaders based on religiously sanctioned codes; 
• Settlement by professional mediators and arbitrators at private 
mediation centres based on international standards. 
Source: Odametey 2007 
 
 
4.2.2 Non-consensual approaches 
 
Non-consensual approaches are characterized by third party decision- 
making. There is much less diversity in non-consensual approaches than 
there is in consensual approaches. One distinguishes between arbitration 
and adjudication.  
 
Adjudication is a formal litigation process. The decision-maker is a 
judge at a regular court, a specialized land court or a tribunal. The 
process follows formal procedures and rules. Both parties – often 
represented by a lawyer – present evidence to the judge whose binding 
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decision makes one party win and the other lose the case, which can 
only be appealed through a higher court. Adjudication will therefore not 
re-establish the relationships between the parties. The current land 
conflict might be solved, but the hostility may continue or even be 
sharpened. Adjudication should therefore always be considered the 
method of last resort.  
 
Adjudication is hindered in many countries by the case overload of the 
courts. It can easily take several years until a case is finally treated by 
the court, resulting in a high number of land conflicts pending there. In 
addition, it is not uncommon that judges are corrupt and allow the richer 
party win the case. Even if this is not the case, the more affluent will 
always be able to hire the better lawyers.  
 
 
CHECKLIST: What can be done to improve adjudication? 
 
1. Promoting the application of the Bangalore principles of judicial 
conduct – a code of ethics for judges adopted by the Round 
Table of Chief Justices in 2002 at The Hague (www.ajs.org/ 
ethics/pdfs/Bangalore_principles.pdf) 
2. Widespread introduction of legal aid/assistance for the poor and 
disadvantaged 
3. Establishment of a broad range of alternative dispute resolution 
bodies 
 
An alternative to adjudication is arbitration, which is more flexible, 
much quicker and generally less expensive, especially in smaller cases 
in which no lawyers are involved. It also allows for much better concili-
ation, as the arbitrator can also act as a mediator, the only difference 
being that s/he has the last say in the matter. The arbitrator-as-mediator 
listens to the facts, perceptions and arguments presented by both parties, 
who can be represented by lawyers, but don’t have to be. Arbitration is 
therefore a perfect combination of mediation and adjudication, offering 
a chance of re-establishing trust and respect among the parties while on 
the other hand providing a third party decision. In some situations or 
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cultures, this may be more appreciated than a solution decided upon by 
the parties alone. In the case of high asymmetry and the risk that the 
more influential party imposes its will on the other, arbitration will 
probably result in a fairer outcome – provided that the arbitrator really is 
neutral. Unfortunately, there is a lot of corruption in arbitration, as well. 
However, as there is more flexibility in the selection of an arbitrator 
than there is in case of a judge, the chances are higher of finding a 
qualified person who is suitably trained in legal matters, accepted by 
both parties and who will decide fairly. Whether or not the decision is 
binding depends on the legal frame, as well as on the agreements 
between the parties. Generally, an arbitrator’s decision should not be 
open to appeal through the courts. In some countries where the 
neutrality of the arbitrators cannot be guaranteed, however, the court 
should be accessible as an option of last resort. 
 
All micro-social land conflicts which cannot be solved by consensual 
approaches, as well as all meso-social land conflicts among individuals 
or groups that will have to deal with each other in the future and which 
also cannot be solved by mediation (such as boundary conflicts between 
tribes or villages, illegal sale or lease of communal land, or land use 
conflicts between farmers and pastoralists) should be settled by arbitra-
tion. Even highly asymmetric land conflicts such as group invasions of 
private land or evictions from state land can be resolved by arbitration.  
 
Arbitration can be carried out by different institutions. Special land 
courts or land tribunals could apply the method of arbitration, for 
instance.  
 
Adjudication should be reserved for violent and major criminal land 
conflicts such as violent evictions, destruction of another’s property, 
land grabbing, or expropriation through unethical behaviour by banks 
(e.g. forcing loans with extremely high interest rates on people while 
undervaluing their property etc.) which require punishment, not least to 
serve as deterrence.  
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4.2.3 Customary land dispute resolution 
 
In many parts of the world, indigenous peoples have a very special 
relation to their land. For them, land is more than an economic or 
productive asset. It represents home, binds together past, present and 
future and constitutes their spiritual base. Land being such a complex 
issue for them, disputes about it have to be settled in a more 
comprehensive manner. Customary conflict resolution is therefore 
especially appropriate for dealing with these land disputes, as long as 
the conflicts are within its jurisdiction.  
 
Customary conflict resolution is a form of arbitration with a strong 
conciliatory character. This makes it different from litigation as well as 
from alternative dispute resolution (ADR). In other words, it includes 
elements of both: There is both a binding third party decision at the end 
as in litigation and there is a strong focus on the re-establishment of 
harmony as in consensual approaches of conflict resolution. As opposed 
to modern arbitration, the arbitrator in these cases cannot be chosen but 
is defined by his position. 
 
The arbitrators are the elders (generally a panel of exclusively old men), 
whose main objective in conflict resolution is to re-establish harmony, 
cohesiveness and unity within the community. A conflict is therefore 
not considered to be simply a matter between the individuals involved 
but rather an affair of the entire community. The conflict is resolved 
when the conflicting parties are once again reintegrated into the commu-
nity. Much attention is therefore given to spiritual and psychological 
measures such as purification, pacification and reparations, all of which 
are considered to have healing effects facilitating the mental and 
spiritual rehabilitation of victims as well as perpetrators.  
 
Apart from acknowledging the wider dimensions of land conflict 
settlement and focusing primarily on conciliation to avoid any loss of 
face, customary conflict resolution has a number of particular additional 
strengths. First of all, it is generally credited with high legitimacy by the 
community and therefore represents a good or even better alternative to 
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the state justice system – especially in cases of state inefficiencies or 
collapse. Second, it is process-oriented, which guarantees more sustain-
able results than pure product-oriented methods of conflict settlement. It 
is also a very inclusive and participatory approach, which makes it more 
sustainable, as well. Finally, the costs are very low, making customary 
conflict resolution easily accessible for everybody (Boege 2006; 
Owusu-Yeboah 2005). 
 
There are also, however, a number of weaknesses to this approach. One 
of these is that, due to its comprehensiveness and process-orientation, 
customary conflict resolution can take quite some time. Another prob-
lem is the limited sphere of applicability, as customary conflict reso-
lution is generally confined to relatively small communities. It is there-
fore limited to the resolution of micro-level land conflicts. The main 
problem these days, however, seems to be its non-compliance with 
international standards of equity, basic ideas of democracy and universal 
human rights. In customary systems, all are not equal, with women, 
young people and strangers being generally disadvantaged (Odametey 
2007).  
 
Box 16: Customary land dispute resolution in Ghana 
In Ghana about 80% of the land belongs to traditional areas and is held in trust for the 
people of each area by their tribal chiefs. Thus land in a particular traditional area can be 
allocated by the chiefs in consultation with the Traditional Council, or by the family 
heads with the approval of the chief and the Council.  
Madam A was granted a piece of land by a man purporting to be the family head of the 
Bortey family of Zenu, a village in the Tema Traditional area. She was given a lease of 
99 years for residential purposes and was made to pay a premium before the lease 
document was handed over to her for registration. She was shown the land, which was 
vacant at the time. She submitted the document for registration but the document got lost 
at the registration office and all efforts to trace it proved futile.  
She later found out that Mr B was also claiming ownership to the same piece of land and 
had already started development. He had also been given a lease, but by another member 
of the same family who also claimed to be the family head. He had however yet to 
register the document. He had also paid a premium to his lessor and was not prepared to 
let go of the land since he had already invested in it. After several attempts to stop Mr. B 
from developing the land proved futile, Madam A made a complaint to the Tema 
Traditional Council, asking for an intervention to compel Mr. B to give the land back to 
her. The Council fixed a date for hearing and summoned both parties to appear before 
them with their lessors, witnesses and documents to prove their claims.  
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On the day of the hearing, the Council was represented by six elders and the paramount 
chief. The conflicting parties came with their lessors as well as some witnesses, 
including two officers from the registration office to testify that indeed the office had 
misplaced Madam A’s lease document and were still looking for it. The hearing was 
open to the general public but apart from the above-mentioned persons and a few 
supporters of both parties no one else was there. 
The complainant was asked to provide a drink for the pouring of a libation, which is 
believed to be a prayer for the success of the process. After this there was an intro-
duction of the members of the Council and the conflicting parties. Both parties were 
then asked to deposit an amount of money to show their commitment to the process. The 
complainant was allowed to make her claims and call her witnesses, after which several 
questions were asked for clarification. The defendant was also given the same 
opportunity and when all the clarifications had been made, a recess was called to enable 
the panel discuss the issues and give their opinion. 
On their return, the gathering was informed that upon much deliberation the Council 
would like to consult with the elders of the Bortey family and that the hearing would 
continue in three weeks’ time. When the hearing resumed three weeks later, the chief 
conveyed the decision of the Council to the parties. The parties were informed that upon 
consultation with the elders of the Bortey family, it has been established that the family 
had yet to appoint a substantive family head following the demise of the previous one. 
Thus, neither of the lessors had any right to make grants on behalf of the family. The 
previous documents prepared for them were therefore null and void, although the family 
was prepared to replace the land for Madam A since Mr B had already started 
development on it. This would be done, however, only after the appointment of a 
substantive family head, who can prepare valid lease documents to be endorsed by the 
Traditional Council. They were to call at the Council’s office in about six weeks to 
collect the documents. The parties accepted the decision and provided drinks for libation 
and money to thank the Council. 
Source: observations by Cynthia Odametey 
 
While customary conflict resolution is (still) quite popular in rural areas, 
the urban populations most often prefer alternative dispute resolution, 
one reason being that they do not want to be old-fashioned; another 
being that differentiated treatment according to status and position is 
thought to be unacceptable for modern people.  
 
Therefore, it can be assumed that slight modifications of the customary 
conflict resolution - by simply recognising and integrating the principles 
of equity and inclusiveness as enshrined in most national constitutions – 
would greatly improve the acceptance of customary conflict resolution 
as a method. 
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4.2.4 Religiously based land conflict resolution 
 
While many societies make reference to their religion or religious 
understanding when it comes to conflict resolution, this is done some-
times more – and sometimes less - consciously and directly. In many 
countries, religiously based morals and values have entered directly into 
customary or formal law. In other countries, religion has had an impact 
on the philosophy that has influenced formal lawmaking. In still other 
countries, religion is unconsciously referred to in land conflict reso-
lution. In quite a number of countries, however, religious law is equal to 
state law. In most Muslim countries, for example, land conflict reso-
lution can as often be based on the Shari’a as on the Civil Code or Civil 
Procedures Code – especially at the local level.  
 
In the Shari’a, mediation towards reconciliation is invariably the 
recommended first-order mechanism to dispute resolution. Solh (the 
doctrine of conciliation) appears in seven verses of the Qur’an. When 
compromise is impossible, wasta (mediation) takes place, in which one 
or more persons intervene in a dispute, either on their own initiative or 
at the request of one of the parties (Sait/Lim 2006). As the Shari’a also 
gives high priority to local legitimacy and testimony (as opposed to pure 
rights-based approaches: see Box 4), it offers a favourable platform for 
the resolution of micro-level land conflicts and is often referred to in 
community-based land dispute resolution (World Bank 2005). This is 
additionally supported by Islamic legal tradition, which a) does not 
require any lawyers since the litigants themselves generally plead their 
own case, and b) seeks to address the needs of all parties within an 
Islamic framework, as opposed to the adversarial style of Anglo-
American legal tradition (Sait/Lim 2006).  
 
The advent of colonial influences saw the rise of the legal profession but 
it did not extinguish informal legal practises and local methods of con-
flict resolution (Irani and Funk 1998). Given that land disputes are con-
sidered a family and community matter and that court legal proceedings 
are viewed as uncivil and distasteful in many Muslim societies, there is 
frequent recourse to informal negotiated settlements. These are led or 
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assisted by neighbours and elders, local mosque councils or mosque 
leaders and the wakil-e gozar (the chairperson of the local council or 
neighbourhood representative, sometimes also referred to as the neigh-
bourhood level “advocate”; Wiley 2005). To ignore these community-
based procedures in most Muslim countries is to miss out on the chance 
for land dispute resolution through locally legitimated mechanisms 
deeply rooted in society.  
 
Just as with customary conflict resolution, religiously based land 
conflict resolution – whatever its popularity and efficiency – should be 
tested for adherence to certain basic human rights standards, such as 
fairness, impartiality, honesty and inclusiveness.  
 
 
Box 17: Local land conflict resolution by religious institutions in Kabul 
Kabul has about 2.4 million informal settlers who often resort to informal 
community-based dispute resolution based on religious institutions. In informal 
areas, most disputes arise over matters such as one house invading the privacy 
of another, footpaths being ruined by waste disposal, and snow being cleared 
from one compound to another. In these instances, community-level 
mechanisms are the preferred means of dispute resolution because of time, cost, 
trust and enforceability.  
At the community level, the mosque council is responsible for channelling 
disputes towards the most suitable forum for dispute resolution. Local 
mechanisms for resolution include i) neighbours and elders; (ii) the mosque 
councils, comprising representatives of each mosque in the neighbourhood; and 
(iii) the wakil-e gozar.  
An important feature of these mechanisms is that actors are not always the 
same and none of those assisting in resolving the dispute are paid. No 
permanently standing council for dispute resolution exists, which makes them 
less vulnerable to bribes. Rulings tend to be satisfactory to the parties involved, 
making community-based procedures relying primarily on religious institutions 
an effective tool of dispute resolution. 
Source: World Bank 2005 
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4.2.5 The cultural dimension of conflict resolution 
 
Conflicts are dealt with differently in different cultures (defined here as 
either ethnic or social ones), and so are land conflicts. While certain 
societies, groups or individuals almost enjoy arguing – seeing it as a 
method for arriving at something new (thesis – antithesis – synthesis) – 
others prefer to ignore conflicts, hoping that one day they will vanish. It 
is very important to be familiar with the specific culture’s common way 
of dealing with conflicts, in order to decide which method of dispute 
resolution best fits the case of an ongoing land conflict, and how this 
dispute should be addressed – even if this means never talking directly 
about the conflict issue or actively avoiding one party’s loss of face.  
 
Depending on the cultural context, three main models of dealing with 
conflicts are popular (Zaninelli 2001):  
 
1. Conflict exclusion resulting in conformity and adaptation 
through deterrence and social control. Conflicts are generally 
suppressed. 
2. Conflict balancing aiming at conciliation and harmony. Con-
flicts are easily belittled. 
3. Conflict settlement allowing for openly and constructively 
dealing with the conflict, where differences in interests are 
accepted in order to find a compromise. A common conse-
quence of this is that people tend to argue about everything.  
 
Conflict exclusion can become very expensive and is rarely a long-term 
solution (Leung/Tjosvold 1998). However, if this is the rule in a given 
country, ways have to be found to sensitively solve the problem without 
mentioning it. If the de facto expropriation of farmers cannot be ad-
dressed as such, it might be acceptable to discuss measures to improve 
food security – which incidentally improve tenure security.  
 
Whether a conflict can be directly addressed and settled, or if people 
would rather try to find balance instead, is very much linked to their 
common way of communication. Conflict settlement (or in other words 
having conflicts out) is only possible in an environment where contro-
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versial opinions can be directly discussed and where conflicts can be 
sorted out verbally and analytically. Such a way of addressing conflicts 
is much more accepted in a context which is object-focused and indi-
vidualistic than in societies that are based on collectivism. In the latter 
case, verbal confrontation is generally neutralised by ignoring it and 
contradictions minimized by referring to common interests and object-
ives and appealing to mutual friendship, all of which often results in 
negating the conflict. In such an environment, conflicts may only be 
referred to indirectly, and preferably not face-to-face but through an 
intermediary (Pedersen/Jandt 1996; Zaninelli 2001).  
 
Customary conflict resolution fits in very well with the requirements of 
cultures based on balancing conflicts. In a traditional context, dispute 
resolution requires the intervention of a respected intermediary with 
decision-making authority. Therefore, consensual approaches won’t 
work, and what is needed is arbitration. This, however, can include 
aspects of conciliation or mediation – giving priority to the re-establish-
ment of harmony and good relations.  
 
No matter what the cultural context, a conflict is best solved if the 
dispute resolution ends with a locally practised ritual: shaking hands, 
having a drink, making a sacrifice, etc. People need rites to put an end to 
a dispute and to be able to enter into a new era of mutual trust. 
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4.3 Land dispute resolution bodies 
 
While a wide range of conflict resolution mechanism options (including 
consensual, non-consensual and customary approaches) can be con-
sidered positive, a strict hierarchy of institutions is nonetheless required. 
This will eliminate the tendency for “institutional shopping” (whereby 
those affected by conflict choose whatever institution they think will be 
most favourable to their case) pursuing parallel channels, or trying again 
with other institutions after a case is lost – as long as there is a chance to 
win it. Experience shows that such parallelism leads to wastefully high 
spending on legal battles and can even undermine the credibility of the 
entire judicial system (Deininger 2003). 
 
In most countries, a number of formal and informal channels exist 
through which the litigants can pursue their interests, such as: 
 
• Judiciary 
• Special Land Courts 
• Administration 
• Political institutions 
• Party system 
• Customary institutions 
• Religious institutions 
• Civil society 
• Private sector mediators 
 
Many of these channels can be addressed or accessed at different levels; 
others are restricted to only one or two levels. Some channels are more 
formal and regulated, while others are rather informal and unregulated. 
Whether a land conflict resolution body is considered formal or informal 
– especially at the local level – varies greatly between countries. Table 8 
gives an overview of potential land conflict resolution bodies at differ-
ent levels and through different channels.  
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Tab. 8: Potential land conflict resolution bodies (examples) 
Channel Village / 
Community / 
Neighbourhood 
Level 
District / 
Municipal 
Level 
Provincial 
Level 
National 
Level 
Judiciary  
 
• District/ 
Municipal 
Court 
• Provincial 
Court 
• High Court 
Special 
Courts 
 
 
 
• District Land 
Tribunal  
• Provincial 
Land Tribunal 
• National Land 
Tribunal 
• Land Title 
Adjudication 
Committee 
• Stool Lands 
Boundary 
Commission 
Adminis-
tration 
 
 
 
• District Land 
Authority 
• Cadastral 
Commission 
• Provincial 
Land 
Authority 
• Cadastral 
Commission 
• Land Ministry 
• Cadastral 
Commission  
Political 
institutions 
• Village Chief 
• Village Council 
• Mayor 
• District 
Governor 
• District 
Council 
• Provincial 
Governor 
• Provincial 
Council 
• President 
• Prime 
Minister 
• Cabinet of 
Ministers 
Party 
system 
• Village / Area / 
Neighbourhood 
Party Committee 
• District Party 
Committee 
• Provincial 
Party 
Committee 
• Central Party 
Committee 
Customary 
institutions 
• Customary Chief 
• Land Chief 
• Council of Elders 
   
Religious  
institutions 
• Priest  
• Buddhist monk 
• Mosque council or 
leader (Imam) 
• Rabbi 
 • Provincial 
Bishop 
 
Civil 
society and 
private 
sector 
• Local NGO,  
• CBO, grassroots, 
• Professional 
mediators 
• Elders 
• Neighbours 
• Head of local 
council 
• Teacher 
• National 
NGO,  
• CSO, 
• Professional 
mediators 
• National 
NGO,  
• CSO, 
• Professional 
mediators 
• National and 
international 
NGO,  
• CSO, 
• Professional 
mediators 
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Although many of these bodies exist in most countries, they do not 
necessarily have a mandate to resolve land conflicts. It could therefore 
be worth discussing adding mandate and functions to competent bodies 
dealing with land issues. While optimising the existing land conflict 
resolution system within a given country, it is important to analyse the 
existing linkages and hierarchies between and among the different 
conflict resolution bodies, as well as how and where people can access 
the system (see figure 17).  
 
Fig. 17: The emerging land conflict resolution system in Laos 
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Two kinds of land dispute resolution bodies deserve special mention 
because of their high and often not yet sufficiently utilised potential to 
resolve land conflicts: the local dispute resolution bodies and special 
courts only dealing with land conflicts.  
 
 
4.3.1 Community-based land dispute resolution 
 
Within a community the safeguarding and reestablishment of harmony 
and social cohesion is extremely important for assuring a peaceful life 
together. This explains the excessive number of local dispute resolution 
bodies. In many micro-level land conflicts, these are the preferred 
means of dispute resolution because of time, cost, trust and enforce-
ability. The fact that there are many options whom to ask to conciliate, 
facilitate, mediate or even arbitrate prevents the development of monop-
olies in land dispute resolution based on permanently standing councils. 
This makes community-based land dispute resolution bodies less vulner-
able to bribery (see box 17).  
 
Community-based land dispute resolution bodies are highly efficient op-
tions in micro-level land conflicts such as boundary conflicts, building 
extensions on public space, the refusal of right of way, a house invading 
the privacy of another, blocked entries or trespasses, footpaths used for 
waste disposal, or the removal of snow or fallen leaves from one com-
pound to another. 
 
 
4.3.2 Land tribunals 
 
These have many different names, such as Land Title Tribunals, 
Cadastral Commissions or Land Courts, but their objective is the same: 
to deal explicitly and exclusively with land-related conflicts. Some of 
them deal with all kinds of land conflicts, while others concentrate on 
one major type of land conflict, such as illegally allocated state land. 
Both models are possible and make sense. Non-specialised land courts 
help to free general courts from the burden of land-related cases, 
decrease the time people have to invest in solving land disputes and 
improve decision-making by arbitrators who are more familiar with land 
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issues. Special courts or tribunals focusing on a specific type of land 
conflict are generally put in place when there is an unusual accumula-
tion of this type of land conflict, e.g. in post-conflict situations or in 
cases of a previously systematic illegal allocation of state land. The 
specific land tribunals should be temporary ones, existing for as long as 
there is a need to settle these specific types of land conflicts. The gen-
eral land courts could be permanent structures. Both must be constituted 
by the state. Their decisions should be binding and final. Appeal to the 
High Court should only be a last resort. The High Court should only be 
allowed to verify the correctness of the procedure of the land tribunal 
but not to re-open a case. To avoid irregular procedures right from the 
beginning, civil society should be involved in the monitoring of the land 
tribunals, e.g. in a joint commission together with state officials.  
 
Box 18: GACACA Courts in Rwanda 
Offences against property committed during and briefly after the genocide in Rwanda 
are dealt with at traditional courts, so called GACACA courts, at the local level.  
The Government of Rwanda believes that the people of Rwanda should reconcile after 
many decades of division and hatred. In order to achieve this reconciliation, the 
Government feels that it is important that Rwandese feel that justice is being served, as 
there can be no reconciliation without justice. It would, however, have taken over 200 
years to deliver this justice had Rwanda relied on the conventional court system. So, in 
response, Rwanda decided to implement a reconstituted form of the GACACA court 
system, which has evolved from traditional, cultural communal law enforcement 
procedures. In addition, the Government categorized the genocide related crimes into 
four categories. Category 1 included the 'planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors 
and leaders' of the genocide, and only cases falling under this category are tried in the 
conventional courts. Categories 2-4, where involvement was slightly less serious, are 
tried in GACACA courts. Category 4 exclusively encompasses persons who committed 
offences against property – including land. These land-related cases are dealt with at the 
lowest of four levels (cellule level) where GACACA courts have jurisdiction (cellule, 
secteur, commune, prefecture).  
Originally, the GACACA settled village or familial disputes. They were constituted as 
village assemblies, presided over by the village elders, where each one could ask to 
speak. GACACA means "justice on the grass," as grass is the gathering place. The 
GACACA court is thus a system of grassroots legal bodies, inspired by tradition. The 
current Rwandan GACACA court system, as established in March 2001, involves both 
plaintiffs and witnesses in an interactive court proceeding against alleged criminals who 
took part in the genocide. 
Traditionally, village elders called Inyangamugayo (Kinyarwanda for "uncorrupted") 
would convene all parties to a crime and mediate a solution involving reparations or 
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some act of contrition. The judges now qualified as Inyangamugayo have basic judicial 
training and are elected by Rwandans to serve in the GACACA courts. The defendants do 
not have lawyers, but all village inhabitants can participate and intervene, either against 
or in favour of the defendant.  
This new process is supposed to significantly speed up trials and sentencing. The 
GACACA courts also have the advantage of involving the community in the trial and 
sentencing process. The Government of Rwanda believes that involving the entire 
population in the trials can contribute significantly to reconciliation. The process revives 
traditional forms of dispensing justice based on Rwandese culture, and it demonstrates 
the ability of local communities to solve their own problems.  
However, as the first judgement of a GACACA court only took place on March 11, 2005, 
hardly any information is available so far on how the system is working. 
Source: Government of Rwanda (website; 16.1.2008); Wikipedia (16.1.2008) 
 
 
Box 19: Special Land Disputes Court in Afghanistan – a lesson learnt 
The Special Land Disputes Court in Afghanistan exclusively deals with private persons 
who are returnees or internally displaced and who seek to retrieve private properties of 
which they have been unwillingly deprived since 1978. Neither the government nor its 
agents can use the court to seek restitution of non-private property. The Special Court, 
however, only resolves disputes over formal properties, which most often pertain to 
wealthier individuals and represent a minority of landholds – 71% of the cases involving 
claims of the better-off.  
After a restructuring, today the Special Court consists of 18 judges operating in two 
courts, one for Kabul and one for the rest of the country. A second-level court of appeal 
within the overall Special Court has been established as well.  
In spite of the good intention, the Special Court is failing to deal effectively with claims, 
having resolved only 5% of all registered cases in 2005 three years after the court had 
been set up. The main obstacles are: 
- Lack of capacity to deal with the increasing number of cases. 
- Time consuming procedure. 
- Lack of qualifications as most judges are elderly with limited legal education beyond 
  Shari’a.  
- Difficulties in those cases where property has passed through the hands of several 
   owners, each of which is seeking compensation. 
- High costs resulting from the fact that no case will be swiftly heard or resolved without  
   making a payment. 
- Lack of co-ordination with other state agencies, particularly the police, which makes  
   enforcement of decisions difficult as the police are typically bribed by wrongful  
   occupants to claim they cannot be found. 
- High number of cases that are appealed by the party who lost the case.  
Source: World Bank 2005 
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As with any other court, land tribunals can suffer from shortcomings 
and misuse (see box 19). The following checklist may help to avoid 
common weaknesses.  
 
CHECKLIST: Which provisions have to be made for a land tribunal? 
1. The land tribunal has to be constituted by the state. 
2. The objectives and functions of the land tribunal have to be 
defined. 
3. It has to be defined who will bear the costs involved. In the case 
of general land tribunals, it should be the parties to the conflict. 
In the case of special land courts dealing with land conflicts 
resulting from government failure, costs should be borne by the 
state.  
4. The members of the land tribunal (such as the chairman, deputy 
chairman and support staff) and their individual functions have 
to be defined. It has to be made certain that sufficient staff is 
available to investigate individual cases. 
5. Special regulations should be defined for the procedures and 
duties of the land tribunal, providing for quick and cheap land 
conflict resolution.  
6. It should be agreed that the civil procedure law and rules do not 
apply to the proceedings of the land tribunal, to allow for a 
more flexible approach. 
7. The land tribunal must be established by an amendment of the 
existing land law (Land Act). 
8. Other laws dealing with land issues or jurisdiction may need to 
be amended or adapted as well.  
9. It has to be guaranteed that any person involved in a land 
conflict (or a land dispute of this special kind) can have access 
to the land tribunal. 
10. A condition of the establishment of the tribunal would be that, 
while appeals to the High Court against its decisions would be 
available to any aggrieved party, the High Court would not be a 
court of first instance in any land-related conflict. The High 
Court would only be allowed to verify the correctness of the 
procedures of the land tribunal, but not to re-open a case. 
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11. The members who are appointed to become part of the land 
tribunal must have adequate qualifications and receive special 
training as required. They would need to be both experts on land 
issues and good arbitrators.  
12. The procedures and decisions of the land tribunal have to be 
transparent, and every staff member accountable and bound to a 
strict code of conduct.  
13. The procedures and decisions of the land tribunal need to be 
monitored, evaluated and made accessible to the public. These 
duties should be performed by a joint commission made up of 
representatives from both NGOs and the state.  
 
 
4.4 “Technical” tools for solving land conflicts 
 
In the case of land conflicts, conflict resolution often needs to be accom-
panied by technical tools. For instance, a boundary has to be (re-)deter-
mined, future land use needs to be agreed upon, usage rights have to be 
documented etc. Technical tools to solve land conflicts range from 
securing property rights and land registration over land use planning and 
land readjustment, to state land recovery and the recognition of custom-
ary land tenure and administration. They also include local conventions 
and solutions developed by grassroots organisations.  
 
 
4.4.1 Land administration and management 
 
Clarifying, legalising and securing property rights – the key to any kind 
of land conflict resolution 
 
A crucial step in any land dispute resolution is the analysis of who holds 
what type of property rights over the piece of land under dispute. When 
identifying these rights, it is necessary not only to focus on documented 
formal rights but also on perceived rights due to customary tenure or 
modern informal, locally legitimated arrangements. The different 
property rights should be made transparent, documented, neutrally and 
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objectively evaluated, appraised and secured. Only then do the con-
flicting parties have a fair basis for discussing solutions, including the 
fair compensation of one of the parties if necessary.  
 
In the case of informal settlements at risk of being evicted, additional 
measures may be taken, such as: 
• A moratorium to stop forced evictions (as envisaged in Phnom 
Penh); 
• The registration of the entire informal settlement as common 
property or trust land, as successfully implemented in Voi, 
Kenya (GTZ 1998, documentary on CD-rom). Common prop-
erty protects members of the settlement from forced sale as only 
their huts belong to them while the land is not considered to be 
private property; 
• The distribution of occupancy licences to those people who are 
actually living in the informal settlements, which increases the 
tenants’ rights and prevents them from being driven out by an 
increase in land value which might prompt the owner to sell the 
land; 
• A step-wise increase in tenure security, starting with any locally 
adapted form of intermediate tenure and arriving at freehold 
after 5-10 years. This, however, requires accompanying meas-
ures to protect those previously informal settlers who cannot 
afford the increases in tax and fees related to the formalisation 
of the area, such as a land ceiling and the prohibition of land 
consolidation or investment in nearby social housing, site-and-
service or site-without-service programmes etc. 
 
Surveying and land registration to solve boundary conflicts and to 
protect against illegal expropriation 
 
Surveying, titling, and registration are definitely not a panacea for land 
conflicts, as they can create costs that are not affordable for the poor. 
Still, there are a number of land conflicts that definitely need a survey 
and an entry in the land registry and cadastre. Especially in case of 
boundary conflicts between neighbours, clans or administrative units, 
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surveying should accompany the boundary-setting. How accurate and 
therefore costly this should be depends on the value of the land, as well 
as on the characteristics of the conflict and the relation between the 
conflicting partners. In general, land registration should primarily be 
instituted where land values are high, that is in expensive urban areas. 
The rural tenure plan in Benin is an example of an apparently successful 
rural cadastre in a rather poor country (GTZ 2004). There are other 
examples which favour simpler and cheaper solutions for poor rural 
areas, including planting hedges along the agreed boundary line, which 
in addition to fixing the boundary also serves as a wind break to prevent 
soil erosion.  
 
Land registration is generally more important for conflict prevention. 
Multiple sales of land, sales of somebody else’s private property, or 
state concessions on private land only occur when land is not registered. 
Accordingly, surveying and registration should follow the dispute settle-
ment of these land conflicts so as to secure the agreement and prevent a 
renewal of the conflict.  
 
Land readjustment – an alternative to evictions 
 
Whenever there are competing or overlapping interests on the same 
piece of land and all conflicting parties have agreed to give up some of 
their land, land readjustment can help in the process of redistribution. 
This generally only works if no party has a chance to get the entire 
original plot. Two situations are quite common:  
• Land sharing is a compromise between a private landowner and 
the squatters living on his land. Land sharing prevents evictions 
and still leaves part of the property to the landlord to use that 
part for commercial purposes. A readjustment frees one part of 
the land so it can be used by the owner. Sometimes the owner 
can be convinced or even is forced to finance the reconstruction 
of the squatters’ houses from part of the income he generates 
from the development of the remaining land. In India, land 
sharing is very popular and successful.  
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• Land pooling which is sometimes necessary to protect informal 
settlers from natural disasters or to build infrastructure. Land 
pooling therefore is another tool to prevent eviction – generally 
from state land. In this case, part of the occupied land is vacated 
by the settlers in order to gain land for flood protection or road 
construction. Land pooling is therefore also suitable for in-situ 
upgrading, and can be combined with the legalisation of infor-
mal settlements.  
 
Land readjustment can offer a solution to conflicts caused by multiple 
sales of land. If the parcel is big enough for all buyers to realise their 
projects (though possibly on a smaller scale), they can all agree to split 
the property among them.  
 
Land use planning to mediate between conflicting land uses 
 
Balancing conflicting land use is the true task of any land use planning. 
While land use planning is generally a preventive tool, it can also be 
used in the case of existing conflict. In that case, however, it only works 
if done in co-operation with the conflicting parties. Examples are: 
• Participatory planning in a neighbourhood where part of the 
land is needed for public infrastructure; 
• Renewal of existing formal land use plans, together with cus-
tomary land administrators or representatives of informally 
planned settlements, to solve the contradictions between formal 
and informal planning; 
• Buffer zone management around protected areas, involving all 
people who depend on the natural reserve – including hunters, 
gatherers, beekeepers, coffee producers, firewood collectors, 
gamekeepers, environmentalists, local and national officers etc. 
– for the purpose of agreeing on a land use plan which is 
acceptable to all stakeholders. 
• Common property rules by a rural population on common prop-
erty to prevent erosion by overexploitation (see 4.4.2). 
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Public and private investment in the housing market – to reduce the 
demand for informal land acquisition and to avoid forced evictions 
 
Informal land acquisitions are often the result of insufficient housing 
supply. This includes social housing as well as housing for the middle 
class, as the latter quite often occupy apartments that would be afford-
able for the low-income population if only they were available. A broad 
range of housing opportunities offered by public as well as private 
investors can therefore reduce pressure on the system, and reduce 
informal land acquisition and forced evictions. In this context, it is 
important that a wide range of housing options are offered, 
encompassing:  
• Housing for the middle class, 
• Social housing, 
• Site-and-service programmes (especially for those people who 
are faced with forced evictions), 
• Site-without-service programmes (especially for those people 
who are faced with forced evictions),  
• Provision of social concessions for the poor, and 
• Social land readjustment in peri-urban areas to provide shelter 
for the poor. Through conversions of agricultural land into con-
struction land its value increases. Private landowners profiting 
from the creation of additional value share this profit by giving 
part of the land to the state for public purposes such as social 
housing. 
 
Proper state land management – to recover state assets 
 
Weak as well as corrupt state land management lead to a number of land 
conflicts that generally result in the loss of state land for the common 
weal. Most of the measures related to proper state land management are 
rather preventive tools, such as land inventory, ethical code for public 
officials etc. (see chap. 5). Only the recovery of state assets is a curative 
measure aiming to regain lost land. Recovery of state assets is pre-
scribed by the UN convention to combat corruption. So far though, there 
is little experience in recovering misappropriated state land. Kenya laid 
                                                                      Dealing with Land Conflicts 
 87 
the foundations by proposing a land titles tribunal to check, on request, 
all questionable titles to public land being previously allocated. Despite 
being proposed in 2004, the land titles tribunal still has not been 
constituted.  
 
Recognising customary land tenure and administration to settle land 
conflicts due to legal pluralism and irregular customary land adminis-
tration 
 
The recognition of customary land tenure and administration, again, is 
mainly a tool for the prevention of land conflicts. However, it can also 
serve to solve existing conflicts. Once the state and its public institutions 
acknowledge the legitimacy of customary and religious claims and con-
sider their representatives as equal partners in negotiations over land and 
the use of land, mutual respect can slowly be re-established and joint 
solutions discussed. Two concrete measures that have been mentioned 
previously are the recognition of customary rights and joint land use 
planning.  
 
In those countries where customary land is formally considered to be 
state land, it should be discussed whether it would not be possible to 
officially appoint the customary chief to allocate the land, under the 
condition that he respects the constitution and documents all allocations, 
including the fees he is charging. This can prevent customary chiefs 
from misusing their authority against the common good of his people, 
without formalising customary land administration. The risk of formal-
ising local tradition is that this reduces its advantage of being local, 
grassroots, and essentially informal and thereby quick, cheap and locally 
legitimised. As long as there is social cohesion, respected local leader-
ship and norms as well as effective social sanctions – and all of those 
are more reliable than state institutions – formalisation of customary 
land tenure and administration should not be considered.  
 
 
Although all these technical tools can convey a sense of objectivity, 
there still always is a risk that they will be manipulated. Influential elites 
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often act in collaboration with the land administration. Public officials 
therefore often participate in the discrimination of the marginalised and 
the violation of legitimated informal claims (Zimmermann 2004). 
Technical approaches to solving land conflicts therefore need to be 
accompanied by popular or stakeholder participation and monitoring 
(see 4.4.2). They also have to be based on a functioning institutional 
frame and good governance (see chap. 5). This is especially true for land 
registration, as otherwise this can easily become a source for new land 
conflicts (Molen/Lemmen 2004; Törhönen/Palmer 2004). 
 
 
4.4.2 Community-based approaches 
 
“Limited outreach or credibility of state institutions can 
create a vacuum that leads to a power struggle at the local 
level. Where this is the case, working with and building on 
existing institutions in an incremental fashion may be the 
only option” (Deininger 2003: 163).  
 
 
Establishing agreements and contracts: local conventions 
 
Land conflicts can be resolved with minimal state intervention and even 
without any state intervention at all. This applies not only to minor 
inheritance or boundary conflicts but also to extended land use conflicts 
concerning common property and natural resources. The only condition 
is that all affected parties agree on settling the dispute together. This 
includes negotiations and a joint establishment of rules and sanctions 
regarding the use of the common property, and defining who may use 
the land and for what purpose at what times.  
 
These local conventions are initiated by the land users and aim to 
resolve land use conflicts between different users, as well as between 
humans and nature. The goal is to achieve a sustainable use of fragile 
ecosystems, protect biodiversity and – at the same time – provide a 
long-term economic base for the local community.  
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Common cases of this are local conventions between farmers and 
pastoralists who solve their land use conflicts by fixing livestock 
passages and regulating the use of it. Another example is community-
based natural resource management by competing camel herders and 
gatherers who live from the wild fruits of trees in the same area. All of 
these local conventions are performed and monitored by the affected 
land users. They can remain informal or become legally binding through 
authorisation by public administration – depending on local need and 
national law.  
 
For examples of local conventions, including the original documents in 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Mauritania, see GTZ 2003 and 
2007. 
 
A major advantage of local conventions is that they re-establish mutual 
respect and that they document the will to cooperate. By agreeing 
together on the future rules and sanctions, stakeholders assume 
responsibility and feel much more obliged to adhere to the rules, even 
accepting the payment of fines in case of offence against the convention.  
 
People-managed resettlement programs  
 
The urban poor, too, can take the initiative to settle land conflicts by 
surveying their settlements themselves, documenting the names and 
claims of the settlers, identifying available lands adequate for resettle-
ment, and being involved in designing, planning and implementing the 
resettlement programme. They can thereby actively contribute to avoid-
ing forced evictions and find themselves homes with long-term perspec-
tives. At the same time, they can improve their social status by proving 
that they can take care of themselves if only the state treats them as full 
and equal citizens and agrees to collaborate (Patel/D’Cruz/Burra 2002).  
 
“Perhaps the most significant initiative today in urban areas 
of Africa and Asia in addressing poverty […] is the work of 
organizations and federations formed and run by the urban 
poor and homeless, […] one of their priorities being 
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working with governments to show how city redevelopment 
can avoid evictions and minimize relocations, […] thereby 
triggering changes in how politicians and bureaucrats per-
ceive poor people: no longer just as clients and beneficiaries 
but as active agents” (D’Cruz/Satterthwaite, 2005: 1). 
 
 
4.5 Creating mutual understanding and (re-)establishing respect 
and trust  
 
Most of the technical tools described here depend on the co-operative 
attitude of all conflict parties. This can either be established by 
consensual conflict resolution or by other means of establishing or re-
establishing mutual respect and trust.  
 
Land conflicts - like any other type of conflict – often end up moving in 
vicious circles. Conflict parties stick to their positions and uncon-
sciously force one another to adopt increasingly extreme positions. 
People normally tend to project negative characteristics onto one 
another until the opposite party finally incorporates them. Reality 
becomes more and more disguised and distorted, and the other conflict 
party ends up being blamed for all the negative aspects of life (e.g. 
squatters often make the state responsible for all their problems, while 
the state considers squatters to be a handicap to any development what-
soever). In such situations it becomes necessary that both conflicting 
parties change their perception of the other so as to pave the way for an 
equitable dialogue. This can be achieved by socio-drama (see 3.4). 
Generally, it cannot be expected that both parties will initially be willing 
to do this together, but then they can at least begin by doing it among 
themselves, thereby experiencing the feelings of the other party and 
developing empathy for their position, behaviour, interests and needs. 
As an alternative, street theatre, puppet theatre, radio plays and TV soap 
operas can be used to deal with the typical land conflicts in which 
people are involved. These allow the spectators to better understand the 
conflicts; what they are all about, why the opposing party reacts the way 
it does and what options or compromises exist to stop the conflict. 
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5. PREVENTING LAND CONFLICTS 
 
 
 
 
„Looking at all the procedures of resolving a land conflict, we 
would conclude that it is easier to prevent a conflict than to cure 
it. In resolving a conflict, we cannot do much about the harm 
that has already been done. It is therefore a more worthwhile 
investment for every government to invest in land conflict 
prevention measures by putting the right policies in place and 
ensuring implementation of what the policies require” (Kariuki 
2005: 99). 
 
Preventing land conflicts means simultaneously avoiding institutional 
deficits, limiting extreme needs for land and reducing opportunities to 
make excessive economic profit from the land market (see figure 4). 
This can be achieved by a combination of correcting institutional 
weaknesses (5.2) and introducing good land governance (5.3). Once 
both are in place – functioning land market institutions and a good 
governance-based process by which decisions are made and 
implemented regarding the access to and use of land – the deeper causes 
of land conflicts will admittedly continue to trigger some land conflicts, 
but these will be fewer in number and should be less violent. Both 
approaches have to be accompanied by intentionally creating an 
awareness of the destructive nature of land conflicts – not only for 
individuals but also for entire societies and national economies.  
 
 
5.1 Raising awareness 
 
Many land conflicts can be predicted and if not avoided at least 
mitigated if provisions are made against them in time. It is therefore 
crucial to be aware of those changes and occurrences that have the 
potential to trigger land conflicts. Once a potential cause of conflict has 
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been identified, the extent of possible land conflicts and the scope of 
their social, economic, ecological and political consequences should be 
roughly calculated, and immediately communicated to decision-makers 
and responsible land management experts at both the central and local 
level. Land conflict experts should preferably discuss with these 
decision-makers which measures should be taken to avoid massive land 
conflicts. Failing that, proposals should be made to them.  
 
CHECKLIST: Typical occurrences that may trigger land conflicts: 
• Privatisation of land 
• Returning refugees 
• Refugees fleeing from neighbouring countries 
• Internal displacements due either to sudden ecological 
calamities such as drought, floods, volcanic eruptions, 
earthquakes etc. or to chronic ones such as desertification 
• Rural-urban migration 
• Population growth resulting in additional demand for land 
• Economic growth increasing the demand for land to be used for 
industrial and commercial activities, which can put pressure on 
land currently used by the poor 
• Growing affluence leading to greater demand for large private 
properties or for land as a financial investment, incl. speculation 
• Sudden and excessive increases in land value creating a high 
demand for private property on land which especially causes 
conflicts (black markets, land grabbing etc.) in countries that 
don’t allow for land to be privately owned 
• Extended building projects that include large-scale destruction 
of existing structures and the displacement of the current 
inhabitants 
• Gentrification, up-grading measures and area rehabilitation 
• Allocation of economic concessions in areas where state land is 
used by the local population to sustain their existence (e.g. for 
slash and burn agriculture, collecting fire wood, hunting etc.) 
• Continuous denial of customary land rights by the state 
• Lack of housing for the urban poor 
• etc.  
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5.2 Fighting institutional weaknesses in the land market 
 
Although weaknesses in the institutional frame of the land market are 
not the cause of land conflicts, their removal can hinder many conflicts 
from escalating or even occuring at all. Four different kinds of 
institutions influencing the land market have to be considered here (see 
figure 3): 
• Constitutive institutions 
• Regulatory institutions 
• Supportive institutions 
• Complementary institutions 
 
 
 
Improving constitutive institutions to establish legal security 
 
Legal security is the key to preventing land conflicts. Where property 
rights are clearly defined and secured and where conflicting interests 
over land can be negotiated in a fair and predictable environment, 
conflicts over who owns or may use which piece of land can be reduced 
to a minimum. The constitutive institutions of the land market include: 
 
• Tenure security: Clearly defined and secured property rights to 
land, i.e. widespread tenure security for all groups in society. 
This may include the recognition of customary and informal 
rights. It may also include the introduction of new forms of 
intermediate tenure. [For details on the diversity of rights as 
well as different tenure policy options see Payne 2002, UN-
HABITAT 2004a and UN-HABITAT 2004b) 
 
• Land registration: To secure property rights, all existing claims 
have to be documented and overlapping interests addressed and 
clarified in a fair and transparent way. Land registration can be 
done in many different ways and does not necessarily have to 
include a technology-based land information system or highly 
accurate surveying. It should be as simple and cost effective as 
possible, “corruption-proof”, adapted to local conditions, estab-
lished with active public participation and reflecting all legitim-
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ated property rights: formal, informal, customary and religious; 
state, private and common/collective; primary and secondary; 
permanent and temporary. In areas with great potential for land 
conflicts such as peri-urban areas, systematic land registration 
should be considered.  
 
• Customary land administration: To prevent conflicts resulting 
from either legal pluralism or a misuse of customary power over 
land allocation, a number of provisions can be made:  
o Legal recognition of customary land rights. 
o Identification of the boundaries of customary areas. 
o Identification of tasks and responsibilities of customary 
chiefs. 
o Improvements in record-keeping, to avoid multiple allo-
cations of the same parcel. 
o Adjustment of customary land law to conform with the 
national constitution and human rights doctrines in regard 
to equity. 
o Establishment of local control mechanisms and the intro-
duction of sanctions for chiefs misusing their authority by 
irregularly allocating land for their own profit. 
o Empowerment of communities living on customary land 
classified as state land to directly negotiate with investors 
who receive concessions there from the state in order to 
prevent people being dispossessed of their customary 
rights but instead to share in the profit made from and on 
their lands. 
 
• Rule of law: The establishment of the rule of law is a prerequis-
ite for all other measures for the prevention and resolution of 
land conflicts. This includes clearly defined, non-concealing, 
non-contradictory laws, legal norms and by-laws without loop-
holes, clearly defined roles, functions and responsibilities of all 
participating actors, a hierarchical court structure, administra-
tive courts responsible for monitoring, an independent media 
and public participation in the making of laws and rules (Diaby-
Pentzlin/Zimmermann 1999). 
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Improving regulatory institutions to provide for sustainable land use 
 
A clear definition of land uses which considers all the various needs of 
every group in society – including those who are still unborn – will 
prevent many conflicts over the use of a given piece of land. That is, this 
is so if these defined uses reflect local needs and have been communica-
ted to the public. The regulatory institutions of the land market include: 
• Land management, which consists of a number of activities: 
o A fundamental precondition to avoiding conflict over the 
use of land is a comprehensive land use planning. This 
planning will anticipate and guide (future) land use and 
development while respecting existing structures. An 
important element is the early designation of land that 
will be needed for certain purposes in the future, in-
cluding the reservation of those lands for these purposes. 
o Land use and building standards have to be realistic and 
adapted to local conditions, as otherwise they will be 
widely violated and result in unnecessary conflicts. [For 
more information on adequate regulations and standards 
see Payne/Majale 2004.] 
o In the case of legal pluralism, it has to be assured that 
customary land administrators are involved in the land use 
planning for their areas, to avoid dual planning and the 
land use conflicts resulting from that. 
o Active involvement of citizens in land use planning – 
especially at neighbourhood and village level – can 
radically reduce land use conflicts, as the land use plan 
can then be adapted to the needs of the local population 
who will feel more bound to it as a consequence.  
o To avoid intense land speculation and land grabbing at the 
urban fringes, mechanisms should be introduced to ensure 
that any added value created by the transformation of 
agricultural land to development land automatically goes 
to municipal budgets, instead of becoming private profit 
for the land developer.  
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• Ethical principles: Without shared values and a common com-
mitment to social justice and environmental protection, land use 
conflicts will continue to occur en masse. Therefore, principles 
such as equity, the right to housing, protection of private prop-
erty, protection of natural resources and the social obligations of 
ownership should be anchored in the constitution and laws. 
 
 
Improving supportive institutions to increase transparency 
 
Supportive institutions of the land market are those which are not expli-
citly needed to avoid land conflicts but whose presence can increase 
transparency and thereby reduce the occurrence of certain types of land 
conflicts. Land valuation is a supportive measure that can reduce 
conflicts related to the value of the land, such as disagreements on the 
amount of compensation, registration fees or land tax. Correct land 
valuation can also prevent people from losing their land to banks who 
might undervalue their property and unjustifiably expropriate their 
customers’ collateral in the case of inability to pay back their loan. 
 
 
Improving complementary institutions to improve access to land by 
improved access to capital 
 
A number of land conflicts occur as a result of an inability to buy a 
property or to finance adequate building material. In certain situations – 
but not all – easy access to credit could improve the situation. In add-
ition to bank loans, a wide variety of local funds should be made avail-
able to people to invest in housing. To avoid systematic expropriation of 
borrowers’ land by banks, an external bank control mechanism (to 
check the valuation of properties, among other things) and eventually 
maximum interest rates should be introduced.  
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5.3 Promoting good land governance 
 
“There is no substitute for dealing with grievances and 
demands early in their history; such is the normal business 
of politics and governance” (Zartman 1991: 301). 
 
Land conflicts are the visible manifestation or outcome of the often 
invisible power and politics concerning access to and use of land. 
People generally have limited exact knowledge of who has what 
influence on the way decisions about land are made and enforced, or 
how these individuals and groups use that power. Governance of land is 
rather obscure, and often threatened by corruption. To prevent land 
conflicts, land governance has to be transparent, fair and sustainable. 
 
What exactly is land governance? Land governance means “the 
process by which decisions are made regarding the access to and use of 
land, the manner in which those decisions are implemented and the way 
that conflicting interests in land are reconciled” (FAO/UN-HABITAT to 
be published).  
 
How can land governance become good? Land governance can be 
called “good” when this decision-making over access to and use of land 
as well as its enforcement and the reconciliation of conflicting interests 
is done in a fair and transparent way, allowing everyone to equitably 
participate and to receive an adequate share while at the same time 
guaranteeing economically, socially and environmentally sustainable 
land development.  
 
Good land governance therefore requires the honest and serious 
application of certain principles to land policy, land related legislation, 
state land management, land administration, land management, land 
reforms, land conflict resolution etc. These principles include: equity, 
accountability, integrity, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency, rule of 
law, legal security, civic engagement, subsidiarity, security and sustain-
ability (ibid.).  
 
A key governance principle for the prevention of land conflicts is 
equity. Once there is a sense for equity, the realisation of other 
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principles will follow. Equity in this regard has several dimensions. It 
includes the equal recognition of formal, customary, religious and 
informal legitimate property rights over land. It also means equally 
respecting the land rights of men and women, as well as the legitimate 
claims of marginalised and vulnerable groups such as indigenous 
people, orphans, the elderly, minorities, refugees and slum dwellers. 
Equity also calls for inclusiveness of all stakeholders in decision-
making on land issues such as land policy processes, land commissions, 
land tribunals, land laws etc. Finally, it means that all decisions on land 
– including those on conflicting interests over land – should firmly rest 
upon respect for fundamental human rights.  
 
So, in the end, preventing land conflicts again comes down to values in 
the form of the ethical principles that are part of the regulatory insti-
tutions. However, it would be an unrealistic and probably unachievable 
task to make everybody selfless and altruistic. But this is not what is 
expected. As long as land governance is based on these values, mechan-
isms can be put in place that encourage and reward conflict-free (or 
conflict-impoverished) behaviour by individuals. Examples are incen-
tives, checks and balances, a reliable public sector, capacity-building, 
awareness-raising, transparency, monitoring, sanctions, codes of con-
ducts etc. 
 
Box 20: Good Practise: the FIG Land Professionals’ Code of Conduct 
As early as in 1998, the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) published ethical 
principles for their members and a model code of professional conduct that aimed to 
serve as orientation for national codes, identifying key issues that should be included in 
it. The ethical principles comprise integrity, independence, care, competence and duty 
putting special emphasis on the duty to the public: “The first duty of surveyors is nor-
mally to their clients or employers but as professionals they also have a duty to the 
public. Surveyors are fact finders and providers of opinions and advice. It is important 
that they are diligent, competent, impartial and of unquestionable integrity in ensuring 
that the information they provide is true and complete and that the opinions and advice 
that they give are of the highest quality.” 
 
The code of conduct is available at: www.fig.net/pub/figpub/pub17/figpub17.htm 
Source: FIG 1998 
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As land administration is crucial to the limitation of land conflicts, 
applying good governance to it should be briefly explained. In most 
countries where excessive land conflicts exist, land administration and 
state land management are threatened by lack of capacity, administrative 
corruption and state capture. Good governance aims to address all three 
weaknesses. Good governance in land administration and state land 
management is therefore a fundamental component of land governance. 
It includes (FAO 2007, FAO/UN-HABITAT to be published): 
• A framework for transparency consisting of the use of anti-
corruption agencies and whistleblowers, effective contracting 
arrangements (e.g. based on integrity pacts), and customer 
orientation including a system for dealing with complaints.  
• Service standards, benchmarking of performance against that of 
comparable organisations and client’s surveys. 
• Improved systems and services focussing on simplification, 
consolidation and standardisation and resulting in a quick, 
simple and affordable customer-oriented approach, e.g. single 
agencies and “one-stop shops”. 
• Capacity-building and human resources policy to assure 
accountable and adequately qualified staff. 
• Effective use of information technology and communication. 
• Public participation in adjudication and demarcation during 
titling or after disasters that have wiped out pre-existing bound-
aries.  
• International standards of valuation, reasonable tax rates and 
regular revaluation.  
• Independent auditing and secured finances. 
• An appeals system for complaints concerning land adjudication, 
registration, valuation and taxation that is fair, independent and 
accessible to all. 
• Recognition of and support to customary land administration 
(see 5.2). 
• Clear policy objectives for state land management and a classi-
fication of state lands. 
• Accurate records of state lands accessible to the public. 
• Transparency in the allocation and management of state lands. 
Land Conflicts                                                                                          5 
 100
The following key questions can help in the evaluation of the status quo 
of governance in land administration and state land management (see 
box 21). 
 
Box 21: Key questions for evaluating governance in land administration 
• How many days/weeks/years does it take to register a property?  
• How many steps are needed to register a property?  
• What amount of informal payments has to be paid for land registration (as 
a percentage of total registration costs)? 
• Are the registered rights protected under the law? 
• Are there clear and appropriate service standards? 
• Are these service standards easily known to the public? Are they known 
by the clients? 
• Is the application of these service standards regularly monitored? 
• Are there complaint mechanisms for people who are not satisfied with 
land registration (e.g. hotline, customers’ surveys, complaints box)? 
• Is information on properties and land ownership available to the public? 
• Do the land records cover all social groups and all geographical areas, or 
are certain groups or areas marginalised? 
• Is there a state land inventory and is it available to the public?  
• Are there clear, fair and transparent rules for state land management (in-
cluding regulations for leases, concessions etc.) and are they consistently 
applied? 
• Does the government have clear, transparent and well-functioning pro-
cedures for disposing state land, including mechanisms for control and 
sanctions? 
• Are there public displays in cases of boundary demarcation, adjudication 
or systematic registration? 
• Is there any evidence of corruption in court decisions with respect to land 
disputes? If so, what is the government doing about it? 
• Is there any evidence of corruption in customary land administration? If 
so, what is the government doing about it? 
• Is there any evidence that poor people are deprived of their property rights 
due to weak governance in land administration? 
• Is there any evidence that legitimate landowners are deprived of their 
property rights due to their customary origin (vague boundaries, oral proof 
only etc.)? 
Source: Zakout/Wehrmann/Törhönen 2006: 18-19 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
 
 
 
“As for me, I’ll never abandon theft and robbery that is based on 
housing. There’s nothing on this Earth that generates as much 
profit as people’s hunger and thirst for shelter. So I never want 
to see this appetite diminish, even by the slightest amount. In 
fact, I’ve often stayed awake figuring out ways and means of 
increasing the whole country’s hunger and thirst, because the 
degree to which there’s a property famine determines exactly the 
level to which the price of houses will rise and hence the level to 
which profits will climb like flames of fire reaching out for fatty 
meat. When such a famine becomes intense – of course, we don’t 
call it famine; we give it gentler names – we, the eaters of the fat 
of the land, can sit down to devise ways of sharing the fat among 
ourselves” (from the novel “Devil on the Cross” by Ngugi wa 
Thiong’o, 1982: 117). 
 
One man’s meat is another man’s poison. At the bottom of land con-
flicts are the need for shelter on the one hand, and the desire for profit 
on the other. Dealing with land conflicts, therefore, means reconciling 
conflicting interests over land. 
 
Land conflicts seldom result directly from any absence of rules or an 
overlap of regulations. They rather result from the egoistic exploitation 
and intentional continuation of institutional gaps and the disregard of 
formal institutions. The reasons for this are numerous and diverse: 
Many people are in need of shelter but cannot afford to follow formal 
rules for obtaining it. Others simply don’t want to. This could be be-
cause of a desire to resist formal institutions because of previous experi-
ence of disrespectful treatment by them (e.g. through failure to grant 
recognition of legitimated customary or informal claims, or through a 
misuse of power) and the lack of trust or hurt feelings resulting from 
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this. Another reason a person might choose not to follow the formal 
rules and regulations for obtaining land is because of a material desire 
for wealth or an emotional desire for status. In civil war and post-
conflict countries, the exploitation and continuation of institutional 
weaknesses is particularly common. First of all, these situations of 
change and chaos provide the opportunity for economic gain. Second, 
(civil) war evokes and intensifies extreme psychological fears (fear of 
loss and fear for existence) and desires (revenge, power). These create 
particularly pronounced material needs to ensure one’s livelihood and 
wealth, as well as emotional needs for respect and sometimes for 
(moments of) power. Thus, the primary reasons for land conflicts are to 
be found in psychological desires and fears as well as in emotional and 
material needs. The resulting pursuit of individual interests is, however, 
considerably facilitated by the lack of an institutional framework. Huge 
deficits in the institutional framework of land markets are often caused 
by institutional change as well as by other elements of change in society 
(e.g. population growth, massive migration or outbreak of war) and a 
low level of development. However, even a perfectly functioning 
institutional frame will not prevent land conflicts. Just think of all of the 
inheritance and boundary conflicts that occur in peaceful and prosperous 
countries that dispose of well functioning institutions. 
 
The complexity of causes leading to land conflicts, as well as their 
diversity and the large number of different actors involved, requires an 
integrated, system-oriented approach for solving land conflicts and for 
preventing additional ones. First, functioning constitutive and regulatory 
institutions adapted to local requirements are needed. These are tenure 
security, land registration, rule of law, land management and ethical 
guidance. Second, a co-ordinated system of land dispute resolution 
bodies has to be established, to provide for a wide range of options for 
resolution, always giving priority to consensual approaches. Third, land 
governance can and should be improved by applying principles such as 
equity, accountability, integrity, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency, 
the rule of law, legal security, civic engagement, subsidiarity, security, 
and sustainability to the relevant areas. These include land policy, land-
related legislation, state land management, land administration, land 
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management, land reforms, land conflict resolution etc. Fourth, the 
establishment of transparent and accessible capital markets can help 
solve land conflicts, especially when small amounts of money are made 
available at the local level (e.g. through microfinance). Finally, the inte-
gration of psychotherapeutic methods to re-establish mutual respect and 
trust among the conflict parties should be considered and given priority.  
 
The re-establishment of values and the introduction of mechanisms with 
which to implement them in society are of critical importance, espe-
cially in situations of post-crisis and post-conflict. These mechanisms 
include incentives, checks and balances, a reliable public sector, cap-
acity building, awareness-raising, transparency, monitoring, sanctions 
and codes of conducts. Such an established, legitimated and widely 
accepted framework is necessary to avoid abuses and thus additional 
land conflicts before necessary technical approaches like land registra-
tion can be implemented without the risk of their misuse. Only then is 
the following true: „No matter how difficult concerted action might 
seem in the chaos and confusion following conflict, land questions have 
to be dealt with as early as possible” (Du Plessis 2003: 8). It goes with-
out saying that each country needs individual solutions, which are 
adapted to its particular local, regional, national and supranational 
political, socioeconomic, cultural and power-related frame conditions. 
The facts of each specific case will determine which of the tools and 
approaches presented in chapters 4 and 5 should be applied for the 
effective resolution and prevention of land conflicts. 
 
Land conflicts are likely to persist and even increase in the near-term 
and medium-term future. There will especially be an increase in land 
conflicts in peri-urban areas, given persistently high urbanisation rates, 
the dissonance between slowly progressing economic development and 
steadily increasing land prices as well as in the case of sub-Saharan 
Africa, the continuation of legal pluralism. Land conflicts will probably 
also increase in those rural areas, where fertile soil and water start 
becoming scarce or simply are misused. Local contracts will have to 
play an increasing role in dealing with these conflicts in these – often 
remote – rural areas.  
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Ways will have to be found to avoid situations in which powerful elites 
take advantage of institutional change to distribute property rights for 
valuable plots of land among themselves without hindrance. Unfairly 
distributing these lands – which include plots in urban centres, large 
forest areas, fishing grounds, mines, cultural sites of tourist interest – 
lays the foundation for future inequalities in land distribution, which 
negatively affect the development of the country and the living 
conditions of the majority of the population far into the future.  
 
In other words, how can an institutional framework be created in time? 
Which further steps need to be taken? Who are the actors capable of 
implementing these steps? Another pertinent issue is how land use can 
be controlled in the ever-growing cities, and in the face of numerous 
informal actors, both legitimate and criminal, who enforce their interest 
or that of their group against state regulations and institutions.  
 
The first and most important steps in actively and consistently pre-
venting land conflicts will always be to establish an adequate institu-
tional framework and to re-establish (traditional) values by creating 
incentives, checks and balances as well as sanctions aiming at positively 
influencing people’s behaviour. 
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